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A Reconsideration of the Stock Market Exception to the
Dissenting Shareholder's Right of Appraisal
All current corporation statutes accord shareholders the right to
dissent from certain fundamental corporate actions, such as merger,
consolidation, or sale or exchange of a large portion of the corporation's assets.1 A dissenting shareholder can demand that his stock be
appraised2 and can require the corporation to purchase his stock at
its appraised value.3 During the past decade, however, at least twen1. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 496a.77 (Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

13-A, § 908.1 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-73 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-75(a) (Supp. 1975).
2. Several states and the Model Business Corporation Act [MBCA] allow appraisal when a sale in dissolution occurs, but not when the sale is pursuant to a court
order or is for cash on terms requiring that most or all of the net proceeds be
distributed to the shareholders according to their respective interest within one year
after the date of the sale. See, e.g., ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 908.1.B
(1973); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1761(b) (1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1122 (1975); 2 AUI-ABA MODEL Bus. Coiu'. Acr ANN. § 80(b) (1971). Some
jurisdictions are more eager to facilitate corporate reorganization and have narrowed
the range of actions that will trigger the appraisal remedy. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, c. 262(b) (1975) (provides for appraisal only in cases of merger or
consolidation; this allows a corporation to effect a merger through a sale of
assets); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.23(1) (Supp. 1975) (merger or consolidation
only); IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(A) (West Supp. 1969) (denies the
right to dissent if the corporate action is approved by shareholders possessing 80
per cent or more of the voting shares). Some jurisdictions, however, allow appraisal
for a broader range of circumstances. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-909(1)(b)
(Supp. 1974) (lease of corporate assets); IND. CoDnn § 23-1-6-5 (1972) (sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposal of corporate fixed assets); MD. ANN."
CoDE art. 23, § 73a (1973) (amendments to corporate charter that alter contract
rights); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 806(b)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (alters or
abolishes certain contract rights).
If the right to appraisal is triggered, the assessment of a share's value may be
performed by the court, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.455.3 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2080 (1974), or by

a panel of court-appointed appraisers, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(C)
(1975); NEv. RFV. STAT. § 78.510(1) (1973); Thx. Bus. CoPP. ACT art. 5.12C
(Supp. 1975). If the appraisers are appointed, they may have authority to determine
the share's value, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-150(2) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
294:78 (1966), or may be limited to simply recommending a value for consideration
by the court, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (1975) (court hears
exceptions to appraiser's report and decrees value); NEv. RFv. STAT. § 78.510(2)
(1973) (appraiser's report final unless exceptions made). In some states, the use of
appraisers is at the discretion of the court. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2004(e) (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72(6) (Supp. 1975).
The stock valuation date also varies. A majority of jurisdictions value the stock
as of the day prior to the vote approving the action. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1.159(2) (1953). However, the effective date of the action, the date of the
vote, and other dates are also used. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(b) (1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73a (1973).

3. Jurisdictions use a variety of statutory definitions of the payment that the
appraisal is to determine. Some states use "value," see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
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,ty states4 have withdrawn this right with respect to shareholders

whose stock is listed on a stock exchange or is otherwise actively

traded. 5 Shareholders who come within this so-called stock market
262(f) (1975); IND. CODE § 23-1-6-5 (1972); KAN. SrAT. ANN. § 17-6712 (1974), or
"fair value," see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(73) (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §

64-707 (1966); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.78 (1962); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A,
§ 909(1) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2004 (1973). The Model Business
Corporation Act is in accord with these latter jurisdictions. See 2 ALI-ABA MODEL
Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. § 81 (1969). Other states use "fair cash value." See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.23 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.40(2) (1969); N.v. Rnv.

STAT. § 78-510 (1973). OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.159(2) (1953) uses fair value,
but defines fair value as market value. Under the Oklahoma statute, if the stock is
listed on a recognized stock exchange and any shares are sold on the day preceding
the vote authorizing the proposed action, fair value is the highest price at which the
shares were sold on that day (in the absence of fraud or collusion).
4. By the author's count, 18 of the statutes are in effect: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(k) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.23(4) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODa ANN. § 221201 (Supp. 1975); IowA CODn ANN. § 496A.77 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-6712(k) (1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art.
23, § 73a (1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 908 (1974); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 450.1762 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(L) (Supp. 1975); NEn. REV.
STAT. § 21-2079 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 7-1.1-73 (1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-909(3) (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10-75 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-75 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
180.72 (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE § 23-1-6-5 (1972). Arizona will be the nineteenth
state, ARsz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-080(c) (eff. July 1, 1976) (West Leg. Serv.
1975) (no appraisal if stock is listed on national securities exchange or is held by at
least 2000 shareholders), and California will be the twentieth state, CAL. CORP. LAw.
ch. 682, § 1300(b)(1) (Deering's Cal. Codes, Advance Leg. Serv., 1975 Spec.
pamphlet).
5. Most stock-market exception statutes require that the stock be listed on a
national securities exchange in order to invoke the exception. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.23 (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1201 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.77 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17.6712(k) (1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:131 (West 1969); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, § 73a (1973); MicH. Comn'. LAws ANN. § 450.1762 (1973); NED.
REV. STAT. § 21-2079 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE

ANN. § 13.1-75 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72 (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE §
23-1-6-5 (1972). Statutes in Maine and Tennessee state that the exception applies to
stocks traded on "national securities exchanges as defined by the S.E.C. Act of 1934
See. 12(g)." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 908 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48909(3) (Supp. 1975).
In 17 C.F.R. § 230.153(b) (1975), the term "national securities exchange" is
defined as a securities exchange registered as a national securities exchange under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Any exchange may be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as a national securities exchange by filing a
registration statement with the Commissioner. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1970). As of
June 30, 1974, there were 13 exchanges so registered: American Stock Exchange,
Inc.; Board of Trade of the City of Chicago; Boston Stock Exchange; Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Inc.; Cincinnati Stock Exchange; Detroit Stock Exchange; Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc.; National Stock Exchange; New York Stock Exchange,
Inc.; Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.; PBW Stock Exchange, Inc.; Intermountain Stock
Exchange; Spokane Stock Exchange. 40 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1974).
Instead of using "national securities exchange," Pennsylvania and Utah specify the
New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1515(L) (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-75 (1973). Rhode Island
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exception6 must either accede to the corporate action with which

they disagree or sell their shares on the market.
requires only a "full, free, fair and active market." R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-73
(1970).
A majority of these 20 jurisdictions also invoke the exception when the shares are
held by at least 2000 shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k)
(1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608-22 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6712(k)
(1974); IA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(3) (West 1969); MicH.COMP. LAws ANN. §
450.1762(1) (1973); R.I. Gm. LAws ANN. § 7-1.1-73 (1970); VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-75(i) (Supp. 1975); see also text at notes 38, 39 infra. Pennsylvania uses 2500
instead of 2000. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(L) (Supp. 1975). New Jersey
lowered its shareholder requirement to 1000 in 1972. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A:11-1.
(1)-(4) (Supp. 1975). The minimum shareholder requirement is designed to apply
the exception to certain stocks traded over the counter. The over-the-counter market
includes all publicly traded securities except those traded on organized exchanges.
Stocks are traded there if they do not qualify for national exchange listing, are closely
held or unseasoned, have a high price, or if there is little speculative interest in the
shares. See F. AMLING, INvEsTMENTs: AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 226 (1974). It is estimated that the shares of over 20,000 corporations
are traded over the counter. J. Loim & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EvIDENCE 4 (1973). In the second quarter of 1975, over-the-counter
trading in common stocks accounted for 9.4 per cent of all U.S. common stock
trading activity. SEC, 34 STAT. BuLL. 847 (Oct. 1975).
The most recent adoption of a stock-market exception statute is in California's
General Corporation Law, which becomes effective January 1, 1977. It will apply
the exception to stocks listed on a national securities exchange certified by the
Commissioner of Corporations and to stocks on the list of over-the-counter margin
stocks issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. However,
the exception will not apply to any stock if there is any restriction imposed on its
transfer by the corporation or by law or regulation. Also, if the owners of five per
cent or more of the outstanding shares dissent, the exception will not apply. CAL.
CORP. Lw. ch. 682, § 1300(b) (1) (Deering's Cal. Codes, Advance Leg. Serv., 1975
Spec. pamphlet).
6. There is an important distinction between an appraisal statute that requires the
payment of "market value," and an appraisal statute that includes the stock market
exception, sometimes referred to as the "market out" or "cash out" provision. If an
appraisal statute demands the payment of market value, appraisers calculate a "market
value" which may or may not be the market price. The stock-market exception
eliminates appraisal altogether, and requires the dissenting shareholder either to
accede to the majority's action or to sell his interest in the enterprise on the market.
If the dissenter chooses to sell, the sole criterion of his shares' value becomes the
prevailing market price.
Another important consideration is that the stock-market exception operates only
where the right to dissent has been granted. Since the stock market exception takes
away statutory rights, the provision's impact is less severe in a state that has granted
fewer dissenters' rights. For example, if a state allows appraisal only in cases of
proposed corporate mergers, then the stock market exception is actually the rule for
all other types of fundamental changes requiring shareholder approval. The exception also exists in de facto form when the state denies shareholders the right to
approve a particular proposed action. For example, proposed amendments to section
73 of the MBCA provide that shareholder approval not be required if a plan of
merger or consolidation does not increase the number of outstanding shares of the
corporation by more than 20 per cent. By deleting the requirement for a shareholder
vote, the proposed amendment eliminates the right to demand payment for the shares.
See SuBcoMMrrTEE ON DISSENTERS' RIGHTS, COMMITTEE ON CoRPORATE LAws,
SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BusINEss Law (hereinafter SuncoMMrrrEE), PRELIMINARY DRAFrs OF AMENDMENTS To SECnToNs 79, 80 and 81 OF
THE MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT 3 (Feb. 11, 1976).
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Legislation has attempted to balance fairly the interests of the
dissenting shareholder against the corporation's need to reorganize in
response to changing economic conditions. The bull market that
lasted through 1972 persuaded many drafters of corporate statutes
that a dissenting shareholder's interests were adequately protected if
he could sell his shares on the market. Accordingly, they promulgated the stock market exception to limit the situations in which the
appraisal remedy might inhibit needed corporate flexibility. Low
stock prices during 1973 and 19741 have generated a need to reassess
this balancing of interests and to reconsider the desirability of the
stock market exception.'
This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that
appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and
that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining
inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for
a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its
intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects
the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.
I. Tim ORIcGIN OF THE STOCK MARKET EXCEPTION
Corporations in the early nineteenth century were small, closely
held enterprises that resembled modem ordinary partnerships.' The
shareholder had a personal interest in his investment and generally
played a superintending role to protect it.10 Courts during this
period fiercely protected property rights in situations where the possession and accumulation of property was deemed conducive to in7. After hitting a high of 1051.71 on January 11, 1973, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average declined by more than one third, falling to 658.790 on January 10, 1975.
The Value Line composite index, which is more indicative of how the average investor fared, was diminished by more than half in the same period. The average issue
on the New York Stock Exchange fell 46 per cent; the average issue on the American
Stock Exchange fell 57 per cent. Two thirds of the 15 best performing stock groups
on the Standard and Poor's 500 Index were lower in value in 1975 than in 1973.
Bus. WEEK, Jan. 27, 1975, at 50-51.
8. The MBCA version of the stock market exception rule, 2 ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 80 (1969), is currently being reevaluated by a panel on dissenters'
rights of the Committee on Corporate Laws. See generally SUBCOMMITTEE,
PRELIMINARY DRA1nrs OF AMENDMENTS TO MBCA §§ 73, 80, 81 (Nov. 17, 1975).
Proposed amendments to section 80 would also provide the right to dissent for
additional categories of corporation actions. See COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS
OF THE ABA (Practice Handbook 1974) (any plan of exchange); SuBcOMMrrrEn,
supra note 6, at 4; (amendments to articles of incorporation that materially and
adversely affect rights of dissenting shareholder).
9. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 CoRNELL L.Q. 420 (1930).
10. Cf. J. HuRsT, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusiNEss CORPORATION IN THE LAV
OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 86 (1970).
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Accordingly, they viewed the rela-

tionship between the shareholder and the corporation as a strong one
and granted shareholder interests the status of vested property
rights. 12 Because of the danger that a majority shareholder might act
to reduce the value of a minority shareholder's vested interest or to
render that interest worthless, unanimity of all3 shareholders was
required to effect a fundamental corporate action.'
As long as corporations remained small and closely held, the rule
of unanimity was only a minor limitation on corporate flexibility. The
tremendous expansion of commerce in the last half of the nineteenth
century, however, created a need for larger and more complex corpo-

rate entities.

4

Yet the rule of unanimity impeded corporate reorgan-

ization necessary for economic growth by permitting any shareholder

to enjoin a corporate action with which he did not agree. 5 Growing
corporations began to circumvent the rule by settling with dissenters
through payments that far outweighed the value of the shareholders'
Recognizing the need for corporate flexibility, courts
interests.1

proceeded to temper the rule of unanimity by allowing dissenters to
recover the value of their shares in cash from the corporation in
situations where the costs of upsetting the transaction would be
excessive. 7 Thus, courts gradually retreated from the rule of una11. See Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 248, 290 (1973).
12. Cf. City of Evansville v. Hall, 14 Ind. 27 (1860); Graydon's Exrs. v.
Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. (8 Green) 229, 233 (1872); Arnold v. Ruggles, 1 R.I. 165, 174
(1837); Moore v. Schuppert, 22 W. Va. 282, 291 (1883).
13. Levy, supra note 9, at 420.
14. See Hurst, supra note 10, at 72.
15. Levy, supra note 9, at 420; Pierce, Right of Dissenting Shareholder to
Appraisal,in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 145 (1952).

16. See Johnson v. Baldwin, 221 S.C. 141, 154, 69 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1952);
Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 233, 236-37 (1931).
17. An early example of this approach is Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa.
42 (1858) where minority shareholders sought an injunction against the merger of
two railroads. The economic boom of the late nineteenth century began in railroading, and, predictably, pressures for increased corporate flexibility appeared initially in
that industry. The Lauman court responded sympathetically to this interest and held
that the dissenters could not prevent the merger if the corporation repurchased the
stock when its value was subsequently ascertained. Thus, the court embraced the
logic of the appraisal remedy and struck a balance that not only allowed the corporate transaction to proceed but also protected the dissenters, who could not be forced
into the corporation and would receive a payment for the value.of their stock.
To facilitate corporate reorganization courts occasionally tempered the rule of
unanimity by allowing the dissenters to recover the value of their shares, on the
theory that the property interest represented by the stock had been converted by the
corporate majority. Lattin, supra note 16, at 236-37. This judicial approach was
applied, for example, where the dissenter had delayed seeking injunctive relief, the
granting of which would now impose a particularly severe burden on the corporation.
See Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928),
cited in Lattin, supra note 16, at 234 n.1. It was also applied where intervening
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nimity as the guarantor of shareholder interests, but articulated the
principle that a shareholder could not be compelled to accept what
was, in effect, an investment in a completely different corporation.
Legislatures of the early twentieth century, sympathetic to the
furtherance of corporate interests impaired by obsolete common-law
rules, joined in the attack on the rule of unanimity by enacting
statutes that allowed corporations to effect changes by a simple
majority vote.' 8 These statutory provisions were soon thought, however, to impinge too greatly on the interests of the shareholder.1"
Legislatures responded by developing the appraisal concept, which
granted dissenters the right to receive the cash value of their stock as
compensation for the elimination of the common-law rule that a
single shareholder could block a corporate action.20 The early appraisal statutes, therefore, reflected a balancing of the need to facilitate corporate structural changes required by changing economic
conditions against the need to protect the investments of dissenting
shareholders.2 1
This scheme remained substantially intact until the mid-1960s
when the appraisal remedy as applied to shareholders whose stock was
widely held came under rigorous attack by several commentators. 2 2
purchasers came innocently to possess a share of the corporate enterprise. See
Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904), discussed in Lattin, supra note
16, at 236.
18. See, e.g., S.D. LAws, ch. 118, S.B. 41 (1909) (three-fourths majority), as
amended S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 47-4-13 (1967).
19. Where the majority-rule statutes did not specify remedies for nonconsenting
shareholders, courts construed them as not abrogating the court-created "right" of the
dissenter to demand the value of his shares. See, e.g., Kremer v. Public Drug Co., 41
S.D. 365, 374, 170 N.W. 571, 573-74 (1919).
20. See Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941); Francis I. du Pont
& Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A.2d 629, 634 (Del. Ch. 1975); In re
Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 181, 93 N.E. 522, 523-24 (1910); Winfree v. Riverside
Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 724, 75 S.E. 309, 312 (1912). Contra, Folk, Revisiting
the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and the
Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C. L. REv. 768, 860 n.384 (1965). Folk believes that
appraisal is a transitional device that has allowed the corporation to take action
without complying with the common-law rule of unanimity, and that since the rule of
unanimity is unlikely to be applied today, there is no reason for appraisal. This
differs from the court's view in Voeller that appraisal was developed after majorityrule statutes were adopted in response to the victimization of minorities and a
subordination of their interests caused by the absence of such a remedy. 311 U.S. at
535.
Because the first majority rule statutes affected only railroads, the first appraisal
statutes were limited to that industry. As economic pressures were felt in other
industries and as majority-rule statutes were broadened, the appraisal right was also
extended. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 223, 246-47 n.38 (1962).
21. See Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 28 Del. Ch. 433, 442, 41 A.2d 583, 587
(1945).
22. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 20; Moscow, Aspects of Shareholders' Rights,
18 WAYNE L. REv. 1003, 1023 n.103 (1972) (argues appraisal does not protect
anyone who needs protection). But see Schulman, Shareholder Rights in Acquisition
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The arguments advanced by the critics suggested, in essence,
that appraisal in the widely held corporation seriously impaired corporate interests and did not benefit shareholder interests sufficiently

to justify its cost.
The first contention of the proponents
tion was that those who purchased widely
interest in the nature of the enterprises in
Accordingly, they asserted, the principle

of the stock market excepheld securities had no real
which they were investing.
from which the appraisal

right was derived-that a shareholder should not be compelled to
accept an investment in a completely different corporation-no
longer protected any legitimate interest and thus failed to justify retention of the appraisal -remedy in the context of widely held corpo-

rations. In the words of one commentator:
[Iln substantially every case other than [those] related to control,
the owner of shares of a company listed on a national securities exchange regards himself as an investor in those securities, rather than
as a part of the corporate enterprise. The investor's objective is not
to promote the income of the corporation but to enhance his distributive share, not to increase the corporate assets but to enhance the
value of his securities. Since the measurement of these objectives is
provided 23by the exchanges... dissent and appraisal no longer [were]
required.

Transactions: A Dissent, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1041, 1067 (1972)

("[W]hen the

transaction is unfair to one group, their ability to leave the venture is no more a
justification for the elimination of their appraisal rights than it would be a justification for eliminating their right to seek judicial review of such transactions"). The
arguments advanced by the critics in the early 1960's are sometimes uncritically
accepted 15 years later. See Note, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by Merger: The
Search for a Rule, 37 U. PrrT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1975).
23. Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAw. 291,
303 (1968). See also Kerr & Letts, Appraisal Procedures for Dissenting Delaware
Stockholders, 20 Bus. LAw. 1083, 1084 (1965). Superficially, this statement appears
reasonable, since the large corporate enterprise with thousands of shareholders is
obviously considerably different than the early corporation where a few shareholders
owned the corporation and controlled its actions. The new, larger corporation which
emerged in the late nineteenth century did possess a small, powerful leadership which
was able to make decisions unaffected by the desires of most shareholders. 2 J. DAVIS,
CORPORTIONS 272-74 (1905, 1971 reprint); HURsT, supra note 10, at 85-86. In
addition to the advent of elite control, Professor Hurst has observed a shift in the
pattern of investment that reinforced the trend away from shareholder superintendence of corporate decisions. In the late nineteenth century, investors in corporate
shares were businessmen who, seeking to place surplus earnings in limited-commitment investments, "had an entrepreneur's concern with the profit possibilities and
records of the companies into which they put money." In contrast, after 1900,
investors were workers and professionals who were concerned with assured incomes
and long-term appreciation. These investors were not entreprenurial-minded and did
not take an interest in or closely scrutinize corporation operations. HURST, supra
note 10, at 86. Finally, it has been argued that the growth of institutional investment
demonstrates that the bulk of post-1900 stockholders are increasingly investment
minded and not enterprise oriented. It is asserted that institutions rarely vote for new
management or vote against corporate policies, and instead sell out to express
dissatisfaction with management. The institutions are thought to behave as trustees,
not risking the assets over which they have charge by making structural decisions.
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Second, the critics argued that appraisal obstructed the efforts of
management to plan corporate changes. If the number of dissenters
became large, cash payments to dissenters could sufficiently drain
the corporation's working capital to thwart the entire reorganization.2 4 Moreover, the argument continued, a cash-flow shortage resulting from paying dissenters could cause insecurity among
existing creditors of the corporation and could frustrate postreorganization attempts to acquire new credit. 25 Because the
number of dissenters could not be ascertained in advance of any
contemplated reorganization, the mere threat of financial dislocation
from a substantial dissent might discourage management from suggesting changes which, if actually carried out, would have invoked
only a nonburdensome response from shareholders.20
Third, the critics attempted to derogate the appraisal remedy by
challenging the assumption that the availability of appraisal avoided
the enjoining of corporate actions.27 A principal basis for this challenge was the observation that judicial intervention in Delaware was
no more frequent in cases where appraisal was denied than where
appraisal was allowed.28
The fourth assertion of the critics was that appraisal afforded
shareholders no benefit that sale on the market could not provide.
The appraisal remedy, in their view, merely created a special market
where the dissenting shareholder could be bought out at a judicially
determined price. Accordingly, they concluded that the existence of
a market where the dissenter's stock was widely traded obviated the
29
need for valuation by a court.
Finally, the critics noted that appraisal, like any court proceeding,
HtsT, supra note 10, at 87-88. As the size of the institutions' share of stock
holdings has increased (for example, on the NYSE, institutional holdings have
increased from 14.5 per cent of total market value in 1949 to an estimated 33.0 per
cent in 1974, NYSE 1975 FACT BOOK 50), the passive role attributed to institutions
has strengthened the contention that shareholders are not interested in the actual
operation of the corporation.
24. Manning, supra note 20, at 234. In Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427,
143 A.2d 25 (1958), an action by shareholders to enjoin a corporate reorganization,
counsel for defendants claimed that if the corporation was required to pay the
dissenting shareholders the appraisal value of their shares, the resultant drain of cash
would prevent the corporation from carrying out the agreement. 393 Pa. at 431 n.5,
143 A.2d at 28 n.5. See Note, The Right of ShareholdersDissentingfrom Corporate
Combinations To Demand Cash Payment for Their Shares, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1132
(1959); see also A. CONARD,, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 1137
(1972).
25. Manning, supra note 20, at 234.
26. Id. at 235.
27. Cf. SUBCOMMrI-EE, PRELIMINARY DRAFTs OF AMENDMENTS TO MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT §§ 73, 80, 81 AFFECTING DISSENTERS' RIGHTS 2 (Oct. 22, 1975).
28. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT 395-96 (1972);
Moscow, supra note 22, at 1028.
29. E. FOLK, supra note 28, at 38.
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was expensive for the participants.3 ° Imposition of costs on the
dissenter, they urged, at best reduced his recovery below the full value
of his shares31 and, in the extreme, totally eliminated the efficacy of
the remedy for him unless he owned a large number of shares and the

market price-intrinsic value differential of the shares was signifi-

cant.3 2 On the other hand, they noted, the imposition of costs on the

corporation increased the harassment potential of the appraisal right
33
and thus could subject the corporation to vexatious suits.

The Delaware Revision Committee, when drafting a new general
corporation law, found the arguments of these critics persuasive and
proposed abolishing the appraisal right to shareholders of publicly
held corporations. The legislature agreed and, in 1967, Delaware

became the first state to enact the stock market exception. 34 The
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association
decided two years later to add the provision to the Model Business
Corporation Act.3 5 Many of the leading states for incorporation,
with the noteworthy exception of New York, soon followed these two

initiatives with the result that, now, over two thirds of all corpora30. Attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, court time, and the freezing of the
dissenter's investment for the duration of the proceeding are costs that must be
assumed by the parties and by the judicial system. See generally Note, The
Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Statute: Influence of Cost and Interest Provisions
upon the Efficacy of the Remedy, 50 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1970). Although interest
provisions in many states mitigate the effects of the stock being frozen, see, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 909.9.G

(1974), the dissenter is denied the opportunity to take advantage of alternative
investments for the period of the proceedings.
31. Pierce, supra note 15, at 155.
32. Note, supra note 30, at 60.
33. Note, supra note 30, at 64. See In re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79
N.Y.S.2d 76 (1948). The New York legislature revised the state's corporation law to
avoid this problem in 1950. Note, CorporationLaw-Dissenting Stockholder's Right
of Appraisal-Determinationof Value, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1021, 1030 (1953).
34. New York had passed a comprehensive revision of its corporation law in
1963, N.Y. Bus. CoRP,. LAW (McKinney 1963), and Delaware was deeply concerned
about maintaining its leading role as a state of incorporation, W. CARY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPOATIONS 12-13 (4th ed. unabr. 1969). As a result, Delaware was
most interested in providing an attractive legal climate that would maximize the
flexibility of management in its control of corporations and minimize interference
from state regulation. E. FOLK, supra note 28, at xxii. Passing a statute that would
minimize dissenter's involvement with corporate affairs, as long as it was not
blatantly unfair to the dissenter, was consistent with this overriding philosophy.
35. 2 ALH-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 80 (1969). Since the MBCA
"competes" with the Delaware statute (which is thought to be the most desirable law
for any substantial interstate company, W. CARY, supra note 34, at 9-10) in that those
states that follow the MBCA are vying with Delaware for incorporations, it is likely
that the Committee was concerned about lacking a provision favorable to corporations
that Delaware possessed. Since the stock-market exception presumably makes reorganization easier by eliminating appraisal, the Committee probably thought the failure
to include it in the MBCA would attract corporations to Delaware instead of to those
states following the MBCA. See SUBCOMMITTEE, REPORT OF PROGRESS AND REQUEST
FOR INSTRUcTIONs 2 (Sept. 8, 1975).
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tions listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are incorpo-

rated in states that have adopted the exception.3 6

II. THE ARGUMENTS RECONSIDERED
Of the five arguments in favor of the stock market exception, the
contention that a shareholder could receive the fair value of his stock
by selling on the market was certainly the most persuasive to legislatures during the period of strong market performance of the late
1960s through 1972. However, it has been called into question by
fluctuations in market prices since 1972. Before reexamining the
contention and the related criticism that costs of appraisal outweigh
any benefits, this Note will briefly reconsider the other arguments
that have been made by proponents of the exception.
The critics' first argument, that a shareholder in a widely held
corporation views his interest in the corporation as an investment
rather than as a stake in ownership, oversimplifies the purpose of
appraisal and the role of the stockholder. Admittedly, the historical
reason for the appraisal remedy was to preserve the shareholder's
right not to be compelled to join an entirely different enterprise. Its
practical effect today, however, is to preserve the value and liquidity
of the shareholder's investment, and it is in these terms, presumably,
that most shareholders now view the remedy. Thus, this argument of
36. Of the 1,542 domestic corporations listed on the NYSE as of March 31, 1976,
70.1 per cent were incorporated in states that either have the stock-market exception
or will put the exception into effect shortly:
NUMBER OF LISTED
STATES
CORPORATIONS
Delaware
California
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Maryland
Virginia
Florida
Indiana
Wisconsin
Michigan
Maine
Georgia
Kansas
Iowa
Arizona
Tennessee
Utah
Rhode Island
Louisiana
Nebraska

655
83
63
58
54
34
25
22
21
20
13
11
10
8
5
4
4
3
2
2
1097

(70.1 per cent
of 1,542)
See 1 CCH NYSE Gurma 701 (1976). Of the eight leading states for incorporations,
which together account for nearly three quarters of all incorporations, only threeMassachusetts, New York, and Ohio-do not have the stock market exception.
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the critics attacks only the historical basis of the appraisal remedy and
not the primary reason for its continued existence.3 7
Moreover, the critics are not even persuasive in their contention
that shareholders in listed corporations have little interest in the
nature of the enterprises in which they invest.3 Many corporations
that fit within the stock market exception, particularly those listed on
regional exchanges and those that barely satisfy the 2000-shareholder statutory minimum, have investors who hold large blocks of
stock. Such a shareholder often has legitimate expectations of participating in the making of corporate decisions 9 and may well be dismayed at the prospect of having the corporation merge into a much
larger entity in which he would play only an insignificant role. Furthermore, even if a shareholder is interested solely in maximizing
the value of his shares, he still will be deeply concerned about the
corporation's current and prospective earnings and may thus take an
interest in decisions of the corporation affecting those earnings. The
small shareholder, to be sure, may view his shares as a mere investment. But it is not the small shareholder who is likely to exercise
his appraisal right; rather, it is the larger shareholder who might have
played an active role in the governance of the corporation.
A further indication that shareholders in widely held corporations
have enterprise interests is the incipient breakdown in the predisposition of institutional shareholders to vote in favor of existing management. 40 While institutions may not question minor management
37. The argument that appraisal is not intended to protect enterprise-oriented
stockholders is structured as follows: the only way really to protect the enterprise
interest of the shareholder in corporation X is to preserve his investment in corporation X, and hence preserve corporation X. The abolition of the rule against
unanimity reflected the judgment that protection of this interest was not worth
preventing the contemplated change in corporation X. Accordingly, the shareholder
must accede or get the fair value of his share. Appraisal gives the shareholder an
alternative to becoming part of a changed corporation X, by giving him the value of
his share in the old corporation X. Thus, whether the investor has an interest in that
corporation X is irrelevant. The function of appraisal is to give the shareholder the
fair value of his interest in corporation X rather than to preserve his interest in
corporation X by allowing him to obstruct the proceeding.
38. See generally J.DAvis, supra note 23, at 273-74: "The purchaser of stock
considers that he is acquiring an interest in an enterprise, not so much that he is
assuming common relations with the numerous other stockholders . . . the stockholder looks upon himself rather as a participant in the corporate enterprise than as
an associate of his fellow stockholders."
39. See Leighton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 133, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALiF. L. Rnv. 1, 33-37 (1969).
Studies have
attempted to measure the degree of shareholder control of corporations. See, e.g.,
Palmer, The Separation of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. IndustrialCorporations, 12 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus. 55, 61 (Autumn 1972) (frequency of owner control
of large corporations has declined from 1929-1961).
40. Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 50-53.
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decisions affecting the enterprise,41 they show a general tendency to
make independent judgments on those questions that give rise to the

exercise of dissenters' rights.42 Finally, many of the companies listed

on securities exchanges do not have large numbers of atomistically
dispersed shareholders. Many exchanges have low requirements for

the number of shareholders a company must have in order to be listed
and traded.43 Even if large companies with many shareholders have
low stockholder involvement, it is not unreasonable to expect that
investors in companies on the smaller exchanges may be much more
enterprise oriented.
The critics' argument that the appraisal remedy inhibits corporate
decision-making is difficult to support, and, in so far as there is a
problem, it can easily be remedied. 44 The extent to which corporations are deterred from making structural decisions by the prospect of
having to buy out dissenters is, for the most part, unquantifiable. It
is not surprising then that proponents of the stock market exception
themselves offered no evidence to support their contention. 4" In fact,
41: See Solomon, Institutional Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate
Control, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 761, 785-86 (1974). Solomon suggests that
institutions have a general pro-management policy. Some have a de facto policy of
voting with management, while others will sell their shareholdings rather than vote
against management.
42. As Solomon has observed:
Certain issues, generally those affecting the value of a given security, may
arouse . . . increased opposition to management. These items include the
abolition of preemptive rights, modifications in corporate capital, and changes in
the percentage of shareholder approval required for a merger or sale of assets.
Transfers of corporate control, whether by way of merger or tender offer, also
lead to greater scrutiny of corporate management. The acceptability of the
terms of a merger or a tender offer to significant institutional investors may
affect the outcome of contests for corporate control.
Solomon, supra note 41, at 786. See also SEC, INSTTUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY
REPORT (hereinafter IiS REPORT) pt. 5, at 2749-2849 (1971).
43. See 2 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS 815-16 (1963)
(hereinafter 1963 SEC Sruoy).
44. Early in the process of deciding whether to reorganize, corporations should be
afforded the opportunity to ascertain how many dissenters must be paid. Certainty as
to the number of shareholders dissenting may be necessary in order to determine
whether the payment to the dissenters would decrease the corporate assets to the
extent that a reorganization would be disqualified from tax-free treatment. See, e.g.,
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(C), 368(a)(2)(B)(iii).
Cf. Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1(b) (1955) (requirement of continuity of proprietary interest). However, the
certainty required can be obtained by establishing an appraisal procedure that requires
dissenters to give notice of the number of shares involved in a dissent at an early
point in the reorganization attempt. Thus, abolition of appraisal by means of the
stock-market exception is not necessary to eliminate uncertainty. A remedy for the
remaining problem of whether the corporation has sufficient cash to pay the dissenters is proposed in text following note 49 infra.
45. Manning, supra note 20, provided no support for the argument that corporate
reorganizations are deterred. While the corporate defendant in Farris v. Glen Alden
Corp., 393 Pa. at 431 n.5, 143 A.2d at 28 n.5 did allege a deterrence, supra note 24,
there was no factual support produced. Eisenberg, supra note 39, similarly provides
no support for the contention that the prospect of a dissent does not deter corporate
change, other than his observation that corporate reorganizations are occurring with
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the apparent frequency of corporate structural changes notwithstanding appraisal has led one observer to conclude that (1) uncertainty as
to the number of dissenters rarely upsets corporate plans, 46 (2)
corporations forced to buy out dissenters generally have sufficient
cash reserves,47 and (3) creditors generally seek to retain their business with new enterprises despite the cash drainage caused by dissenters.48 Even so, it seems logical that dissenting shareholders in some
situations might hold too many shares for the corporation feasibly to
repurchase. The undesirability of this prospect is not beyond dispute, since it can be argued that the power of dissenters serves as a
beneficial counterbalance to management discretion.4 9 In any event,
the obstruction of a proposed corporate action by a large dissent can
be easily remedied. Current appraisal statutes require the corporation to pay in cash the full appraised value of the dissenters' shares.
This procedure could be amended to give the corporation the power
to demand that the dissenters sell their shares on the market, with the
corporation paying only the difference between the appraised value of
the shares and the market price realized on the sale. Such an
amendment would produce several benefits. The smaller cash payment would reduce any cash-flow problems faced by the corporation
and thereby lessen the inhibiting effect of the appraisal right on
managerial decision-making. Moreover, since a dissenter might sell
his shares immediately, his entire investment would not be tied up for
the duration of the appraisal proceeding. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the amended procedure would reduce the leverage of
dissenting shareholders and, consequently, the incidence of vexatious
suits.
The critics argument that appraisal does not protect corporations
from injunctions5" is refuted by recent experience with the stock
market exception. It is not infrequent that a court notes the existence
of appraisal as a ground for denying a minority shareholder's request
greater frequency. Of course, it would be almost impossible to prove that appraisal
has had no influence on corporate planning.
46. Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 74.
47. Id. at 73.

48. Id. at 73-74.
49. Id. at 84-86, quoting Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Haritan v. Arco
Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1293 (1963):
[IUt is important to maintain some internal or external control to offset the power
of the directors, unless one assumes that directors, especially when backed by a
shareholder majority, should have unrestrained discretion. Appraisal rights . . .

have, in the past, served as a countervailing power to force the insiders to tailor
their plans to minimize the number of dissenters by getting the best deal possible.
A high vote requirement (including a class vote) plays the same sort of role.
When either weapon is removed, the insider lacks the real self-interest to fashion
a plan acceptable to a sufficient number of shareholders.
50. In advancing this argument, the critics reject one of the reasons behind the
adoption of appraisal-to prevent de facto injunctions which resulted under the rule
of unanimity.
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for injunctive relief.5 1 When a case falls within the stock market
exception and the court doubts the fairness of the prevailing market

price, an incentive exists to enjoin the corporate action to protect the
dissenter's interest.5 2 Where minority shareholders seek an injunction on the ground that the market price is unfair, appraisal is wellsuited to decide the issue without obstructing the corporate action.

In sum, the first three arguments marshalled by the critics have
little force in supporting the stock market exception. The desirability
of the exception, then, turns on the validity of the final two contentions: that appraisal is unnecessary because of the existence of a ready

market where the stock is listed or widely traded and that the costs
of appraisal outweigh its benefits. These contentions require more
detailed analyses.
A.

Market Priceand IntrinsicValue

Advocates of the stock-market exception assume that the market
price. of a stock equals its value. The validity of this proposition,
however, is the subject of much dispute.
1. Theories of Market Action
Students of the stock market have devised several theories to
explain how the market works and what relation market price bears
to value. 5 3 Graham and Dodd's security analysis theory has been the
51. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
1393, 1404 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Greene v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 33 (Del.
Ch. 1971); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 470, 226 A.2d 585, 595-96
(1967); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 52, 249 A.2d 89, 99-100
(1969).
52. This was the result in a recent New Jersey decision, Berkowitz v. Power/Mate
Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (L. Div. 1975), where minority shareholders
were granted a temporary injunction against a proposed merger. Power/Mate was a
publicly held corporation whose shares were traded on the National Stock Exchange
until it ceased operations on Jan. 31, 1975, and thereafter were traded over the
counter. The right to dissent and obtain an appraisal was denied because the
dissenters were to be paid for their shares in cash at the current market price. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(1)(a) (Supp. 1975). Power/Mate had gone public in the late
1960s during the boom market, and was now repurchasing shares at low market
prices, creating huge profits for the insiders. See generally Note, Going Private, 84
YALE L.J. 903 (1975). The court suggested that the conduct of insiders may have
contributed to the decline of the stock's price, and that even if the majority would
benefit from the proposed merger, the question would be whether "the price (the
dissenters) are being offered for their interest in Power/Mate is a fair and reasonable
one." 135 N.J. Super. at 49-50, 342 A.2d at 574. This is precisely the kind of
problem for which appraisal is well suited, yet the New Jersey exception to appraisal
foreclosed such a proceeding. If appraisal had been available, it is questionable
whether the court would have granted the injunction since the majority's plan was
unfair primarily because the market price was unfair. Appraisal could have protected
the dissenter's interest by adjusting market price, and thereby allowed the corporate
action to proceed.
53. Technical analysis, for example, does not deal with the relation of price and
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dominant one for over forty years.5 4 The security analysis theory
posits that market price does not necessarily equal a share's value, and
thus seeks to determine whether and to what extent the intrinsic value
of a particular stock differs from its market price. 55 Intrinsic value is
value, but concludes that investment decisions should be based solely on price and
volume histories, on the assumption that knowledge of the past behavior of a price
will enable a prediction of the future price. The technical analyst or "chartist"
attempts to predict the timing of a stock's reversal of an upward or downward trend in
order to sell or buy in anticipation of a price change. The theory was developed
around 1900 by Charles Dow. H. LATANE & D. TUTTLE, SEcunrry ANALYSIs AND
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 269 (1970). The theory has been severely criticized for its
lack of scientific method. See id. at 270-71; B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE,
SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 712-16 (4th ed. 1962). Pure chartists are relatively rare. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FINAN.
ANALYSTS J. 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1965). For a more elaborate explanation of the
technical analysis theory, see B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOwN WALL STREET 95135 (1973); H. LATANE & D. TuTrLE, supra, at 353-79; E. FOSTER, COMMON STOCK
INVESTMENT 55-68 (1974). Since technical analysis ignores the relation of price to
underlying value, it is meaningless for purposes of evaluating the assumptions behind
the stock-market exception.
A second theory, psychological analysis, best explained and practiced by John
Maynard Keynes, looks solely at the mass psychology of buyers and sellers in order to
anticipate price changes far in advance. The approach rejects the idea that stock
prices are a function of intrinsic values, because such values are allegedly too difficult
to determine. It tries to second-guess the investment decisions of what is perceived to
be a mass of unsophisticated investors. Although not important to the psychological
analyst, implicit in the theory is the idea that price probably will not equal value since
investors act irrationally. Accordingly, this approach gives no indication of what the
underlying values might be. For a discussion of this approach, see B. MALKIEL, supra,
at 22-25; H. LATANE & D. TurrLE, supra, at 271-73.
54. H. LATANE & D. TUTTLE, supra note 53, at 264. See generally H. SAUVAIN,
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 194-95 (4th ed. 1973).
55. The process employed by security analysts to value stocks varies. John Burr
Williams in Trm THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE (1938), advanced the theory that
the true present value of a security, Vo, is the sum of the present worth of all
dividends to be paid on it, expressed as follows where D1 is the first dividend, D. the
second, and i is the rate at which the dividends are discounted:

Vo=

(+iV

+

D2
(1+i)

2

+

+

DN
0 + i)

Williams believed that the amount of dividends is the true and only measure of the
present value of a stock. J. Loam & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES
& EVIDENCE 115 (1973); H. LATANE &D. TutrLE, supra note 53, at 261-63.
Graham and Dodd advanced a different approach, regarding "indicated average
future earning power" to be the single most important determinant of a share's
present value. B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, supra note 53, at 28. The
estimate of future earning power is made by averaging past data for sales volume,
prices received, and operating margin, and then projecting future sales based on
estimates of change in volume and price level over the previous bases. These
estimates are based on such factors as general economic forecasts, projected Gross
National Product, and conditions in the company and industry in question. B.
GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 152 (1973). This forecast is in turn adjusted
by an appropriate multiplier that allows the infusion of a number of less definite
factors into the value formula, such as the general long-term prospects of the
company, quality of management, financial strength, capital structure, the dividend
record, and the current dividend rate. Id. at 154-58. See also J. LORm & M.
HAMILTON, supra, at 122-24. The earnings and dividends hypotheses are virtually
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ascertained by analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the
corporation in question, including its assets, earnings, dividends, and
future prospects, and the quality of its management.
According to the proponents of security analysis, there are several
reasons why intrinsic value may vary from market price. First,
investors may believe inaccurate information about a stock's value, or
misinterpret accurate information. Second, information about corporations does not spread instantaneously among market participants.
Consequently, the market price of a stock, unlike its intrinsic value,
does not fully reflect all available information at any particular point
in time. 56 Accordingly, the security analyst who is first to gather
information about a corporation can take advantage of discrepancies
between price and value. Third, the cost of buying and selling stock
deters market participation when the difference between price and
value is less than the transaction cost.57 Fourth, the decision whether
to buy or sell a particular stock is often influenced by tax policies
unrelated to the underlying value of the stock.5" Fifth, relatively few
investors, even among professionals, have considerable expertise and,
indeed, many are irrational.59 Finally, many investors decide
whether to invest in small, relatively unknown corporations on the
basis of incomplete or inaccurate information. 0°
The behavior of stock market prices at times seems to support the
view that market price can diverge from intrinsic value. 61 Market
identical, since earnings, when defined correctly by accounting for earnings used
internally as well as for apparent economic earnings, have the same present value as
dividends. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra, at 121. See also S. BOLTEN, SECURITY
ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT

29-45 (1972).

The techniques of security analysis have been modified and developed to high
levels of complexity and sophistication. The techniques are explained at great length
in many sources. See, e.g., S. BOLTEN, supra; B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE,
supra note 67; E. FOSTER, supra note 53; B. GRAHAM, supra; C. HUBBARD & C.
HAWKINS, THEORY OF VALUATION 150-65 (1969); H. LATANE & D. TUTrLE, supra; J.
LORm & M. HAMILTON, supra at 113-227.
56. See E. FOSTER, supra note 53, at 73; H. SAUVAIN, supra note 54, at 167-68; W.
BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 44-45

(1965).

Quick

diffusion of information through the market implies that the investing public may act
before making an adequate evaluation of the information in their attempt to profit on
the early part of a price trend. This could exaggerate price swings, thereby placing
an unrealistic value on the securities involved. S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKETS
57 (1966).
57. H. SAuVAIN, supra note 54, at 166.
58. Id. The effect of taxes on rates of return is significant. One study found
that the terminal wealth of a tax-exempt investor in 1965 who had made equal
investments in each common stock listed in 1926 would have been 2.26 times as great
as that of an investor making the identical investments who was in the tax category
corresponding to a taxable income of 50,000 dollars in 1960. J. LORIE & M.
HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 30-31.
59. E. FosTER, supra note 53, at 73; H. SAUVAIN, supra note 54, at 168.
60. E. FOSTER, supra note 53, at 73.
61. The Council of the Stock Exchange, London has stated quite clearly that
quotations on that exchange should not be used for valuation purposes:
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prices are often based on speculative optimism that has no basis in the

economic position of the companies involved.6" "Growth stocks," for

example, are often priced far out of proportion to the earnings

strength of the companies.

3

At the opposite extreme, the market

often grossly undervalues less glamorous corporations with high earn-

ings potential.6 4 Moreover, wide fluctuations occur in market price
that presumably are not matched by simultaneous fluctuations in the
We desire to state authoritatively that Stock Exchange quotations are not related
directly to the value of a company's assets, or to the amount of its profits, and
consequently these quotations, no matter what date may be chosen for reference,
cannot form a fair and equitable, or rational basis for compensation.
, * * [Price is determined by] the actions and opinions of private and institutional investors all over the country and, indeed, the world. The actions and
opinions are the result of hope, fear, guesswork, intelligent or otherwise, good or
bad investment policy, and many other considerations. The quotations that
result definitely do not represent a valuation of a company by reference to its
assets and its earning potential.
Cited in T. BAYNES, SHARE VALUATIONS 22 (1973). However, the London and
American markets may be so different that any analogy of the inaccuracy of price
quotations on the London exchange to the American exchanges is risky. See 1963
SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 18-20.
62. W. BAUMOL, supra note 56, at 39. B. MAL=EL, supra note 53, at 47; G.
McCARTHY & R. HEALY, VALUING A COMPANY: PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 33-36
(1971).
63. At the end of 1972, five growth companies-International Business Machines,
Minnesota Mining, American Home Products, Xerox, and Eastman Kodak-had total
earnings of only 2.2 billion dollars but possessed nearly 100 billion dollars in total
market value, 15 per cent of the market value of all companies on the NYSE.
However, five companies with a strong earnings position-General Motors, U.S.
Steel, du Pont, AT&T, and Exxon-had total earnings of 6.5 billion dollars but had
a total market value of only 70 billion dollars. IBM alone equaled the combined
market value of du Pont, AT&T, and Exxon. Bernstein, Watch Earnings, Not the
Ticker Tape, 51 HARv. Bus. REv. 63, (Jan.-Feb. 1973). Classic examples of speculative enthusiasm are the tulip bulb craze in Holland from 1634 to 1638, and the
South Sea Company craze in England in 1720. See B. MALKIEL, supra note 53,
at 28-36.
64. See, e.g., B. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 81 (Chrysler Corporation, conservatively valued when earnings high, and overvalued when earnings low); id. at 84
(Northern Pacific Railway in 1946-1947); id. at 104-06 (Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Company, in 1938, had a market price below asset values notwithstanding favorable
earnings). Graham says that the market valued A & P at less than its liquidation
value, because its market price was less than book value. This reasoning can be
criticized, for liquidation value is different from accounting-asset value, and if there is
no real buyer for A & P in 1938, its market price should be lower than assets. See
generally C. HUBBARD & C. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 138 (no bid price on the
NYSE for Union Pacific Railroad during panic of 1907: "[Mlost people would agree
that the value of a Union Pacific common share at that time was not zero. To so
admit is to repair to the idea of 'intrinsic worth' of the security"); J. CLENDENIN & G.
CHRISTY, INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENTS 261-62 (5th ed. 1969) ("[Many erratic
moves that take place in stock prices do not appear consistent with the efficient
market in the sense claimed by the random-walk theory. In 1961-1962, IBM stock
rose from 387 to 607, then fell abruptly to 300 despite an uninterrupted rise in the
company's sales and earnings. To say that IBM's intrinsic value changed this much
seems nonsense. A simple and more plausible explanation for this price move is
excessive speculation and its subsequent collapse").
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intrinsic values of the shares.6 5 The fact that corporations have
entered the market in large numbers to repurchase their shares during

the latest round of depressed prices 66 can be interpreted as implicit
admissions by these companies that their stocks are undervalued.

In recent years, however, a body of economic theory and statistical
evidence, known as the "efficient market" or "random-walk" hypothesis, 67 has emerged to challenge the underlying assumptions of secu-

rity analysis. As explained by its supporters,6 the random-walk theory holds that competition among participants in an efficient market69 results in market price closely approximating intrinsic value
65. The period between 1929 and 1942 was marked by very wide swings in price.
The post-World War H era has been a period of long-term improvement with a few
price declines of relatively limited duration. J. LoxIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 55,
at 7. The 1973-1974 market break was the largest percentage decline since 19371938. See STANDARD & POOR'S TRADE AND SECURITIES STATISTICS 4 (1974); STANDARD
& POOR'S TRADE AND SECURITIES CURRENT STATISTICS 40 (Jan. 1976).

One possible explanation for wide swings in price is the tendency of investors to
overreact to news of various types. See E. HELFERT, VALUATION: CONCEPTS AND
PRACTICE 101-02 (1966) ("Mhe stock market . . . is subject to somewhat erratic
swings, tending to overvalue favorable news and to be seriously influenced by
unfavorable developments"). An often-used example of general price depression
caused by unfavorable news is the assassination of President Kennedy. That event
had nothing to do with the underlying economic strength of American companies; the
fall in price is best explained as a function of emotion. S. ROBBINs, supra note 56, at
162. Another example of news which causes short-term price fluctuations unrelated
to long-term value is reports of current earnings. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S.
COTTLE, supra note 53, at 478-79. See generally C. HUBBARD & C. HAWKINS, supra
note 55, at 151; G. LEFFLER & L. FARWELL, THE STOCK MARKET 64-66 (1963); L.
WHrIEHEAD, The Investors and the News, in THE STOCK MARKET HANDBOOK 64-66

(F. Zarb & G. Kerekes eds. 1963).
66. Share repurchases during the last quarter of 1973 and the first quarter of 1974
reached record highs. Norgaard & Norgaard, A Critical Examination of Share
Repurchase, 3 FINAN. MOM'r. 44 (1974). A study of NYSE corporations in 1973
found that nearly one-third of all corporations listed dealt actively in their own
shares. F. WALSH, REPURCHASING COMMON STOCK 2 (1975). Those companies
making repurchases did so when the stock was selling at depressed prices based on
book values, earnings and dividends. Norgaard & Norgaard, supra at 48; F. WALSH,
supra at 10.
67. Efficient market theory and the random-walk hypothesis are synonymous. "If
a market has zero transaction costs, if all information is costless to all interested
parties, and if all participants and potential participants in the market have the same
time horizons and homogeneous expectations with regard to prices, the market will
assuredly be efficient and . . . prices in such a market will fluctuate randomly." I.
LoRE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 80. This statement has been rigorously
proved by Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated PricesFluctuate Randomly, 6
INDUS. MGMT. REv. 41 (1965); see Mandelbrot, Forecastsof Future Prices, Unbiased
Markets, and "Martingale"Models, 39 J. OF Bus. 242 (1966).
68. See, e.g., P. COOTNER, THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 80

(2d rev. ed. 1967); Fama, supra note 53; J. Loam & M. HAMILTON, supra note 55, at
79-80. See also S. BOLTEN, supra note 55, at 29-45; Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. OF FIN. 383 (1970).
69. An efficient market is a market where "there are large numbers of rational,
profit-maximizers competing, with each trying to predict future market values of
individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely

available to all participants." Fama, supra note 53, at 56.

April 1976]

Stock Market Exception

1041

since, at any point in time, price fully reflects all available information."0 Although different participants may disagree on a stock's in-

trinsic value, the actions of the competitors cause the actual price
of a stock to wander randomly around its intrinsic value because in-

dividual discrepancies between price and value are random, not systematic.
The random-walk hypothesis is a perfect description of price behavior only if the stock market is perfectly efficient and frictionless;
obviously such a market exists only in theory. Thus, in evaluating

the applicability of the random-walk hypothesis to actual markets, it
is necessary to make some determination of what constitutes threshold

market efficiency, and to ascertain whether the conditions necessary
to meet the thresholds exist in the actual markets. It has been argued

that there are three necessary conditions for efficient markets: that
information be readily available to a "sufficient" number of investors,
that transaction costs be reasonable, and that, in the absence of
agreement about the effect of current information and expectations
regarding price movements, there be no evidence of consistent superiority or inferiority in returns achieved by significant numbers of

market participants.71 While it is difficult to define these thresholds
more precisely, empirical study of the New York Stock Exchange

strongly suggests that conditions in that market render it efficient. 72 Studies have proven that professionally managed portfo70. See id. New information can reflect changes in intrinsic values but, according to the theory, competition will cause the effects of the new information to be
reflected instantaneously. If the awareness of the content and implications of the
new information were gradual, successive price changes would "depend" on prior price
changes. But if the adjustment to information is instantaneous, successive price
changes are "independent," in the sense that the future course of the price of the
security is no more predictable than the pattern of a series of random accumulated
numbers. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. oF Bus. 34 (1965).
Accordingly, stock market prices change in a random fashion. "The random-walk
theory espouses the belief that future stock prices cannot be predicted. It says that a
blindfolded monkey throwing darts at the newspaper's financial pages could select a
portfolio that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the experts." B.
MALKIEL, supra note 53, at 16.
The term "random-walk" is believed to have been first used to describe the most
efficient way to find a drunk left in a vacant field after a lapse of time. One should
start where the drunk was left, since the drunk will presumably wander in a random
fashion without purpose or design. The starting place is an unbiased estimate of his
future position. Pearson & Raleigh, The Problem of Random Walk, 72 NATUME 294,
318, 342 (1905), quoted in J. LoRIE & M. HAMLTON, supra note 55, at 71.
71. Fama, supra note 68, at 387-88. See I. LomE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 55,
at 80.
72. See, e.g., Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income
Numbers, 6 J. oF AccotmnrG RESEARCH 159 (1968) (found that most information
contained in annual earnings announcements is anticipated by the market before the
actual report is released); Crouch, A Nonlinear Test of the Random-Walk
Hypothesis, 60 AM. EcON. REv. 199 (1970) (serial correlation tested five NYSE
stocks for special conditions and found independence in pricing); Fama & Blume,
Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading, 39 J. op Bus. 226 (1966) (application of
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lis do not consistently outperform random samples of equally risky

stocks.73 Moreover, some giant funds have abandoned the security
analysis approach and attempted simply to match the performance of

the general market indexes.74 It seems, then, that not only public
information but also the type of information available to security
analysts through their individual inquiries7 5 is fully reflected in stock
filter rules to the DJIA stocks found independence in price behavior); Fama, Fisher,
Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INTL. ECON.
REv. 1 (1969) (study of stock splits on the NYSE supports efficiency theory since the
market makes an unbiased forecast of the implications of the split for future dividends); Granger & Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices,
16 KYKLos 1 (1963), (use of spectral analysis found independence in prices in stocks
in Standard & Poor's Industrial Index, discussed in W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET
AND ECONOMIC EFFICInNCY 40-41 (1965)); Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of
Merging Firms, 1 J. oF FINAN. ECON. 303 (1974) (market discounts news of merger
many months in advance); Reilly & Drzycimski, Tests of Stock Market Efficiency
Following Major Events, I J. oF Bus. RESEARCH 57 (1973) (study of stock market
effects of seven major world events found price behavior after public announcements
supported efficiency theory); Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus
Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. oF Bus. 179
(1972) (study of secondary distributions found market anticipates information implicit in the offering). For a collection of many of these studies and a more complete
discussion of their significance, see J. Lo~aE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 55, at
70-97, and Fama, supra note 68.
73. See, e.g., WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF
MUTUAL FUNDS, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,

H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 294-98 (1962) (found that 189 mutual
funds from 1952 to 1958 did not significantly outperform an unmanaged portfolio of
similar asset composition; comparisons of returns of mutual funds and an unmanaged
portfolio composed of common stocks represented by the Standard and Poor's
Composite Index showed few funds performing as well as the unmanaged portfolio);
I. FRIEND, M.

BLUME & J. CROCKETT, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTORS: A NEW PERSPECTIvE 50-68 (1970); Jensen, The Performance of Mutual
Funds in the Period 1954-1964, 23 J. OF FIN. 389 (1968); Sharpe, Mutual Fund
Performance, 39 J. oF Bus. 119, 137 (1966). Although the evidence in these studies
demonstrates profound differences among the performances of individual funds, the
studies establish that no one fund over the years consistently earns better returns than
a random sample. For a collection and analysis of these studies, see J. LORIE & M.
HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 88-96. For a security analyst's survey of the evidence
and his agreement with these results, see B. GRAHAM, supranote 55, at 119-21.
Making a profit on the market is possible if the analyst can devise a technique
that is superior to those used by other analysts. That such superior techniques exist is a dubious proposition. Latane and Tuttle have suggested one
such elaborate technique that they believe will maximize returns. H. LATANE
& D. TUTLE, supra note 53, at 518-45. However, they concede that other
investors will attempt to duplicate their technique, thereby preventing the initial user
from earning consistently superior returns. Id. at 545. See also B. MALKIEL, supra
note 53, at 134.
74. Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1975, at 1, col. 8. A number of major companies
admitted that their pension funds have put some money into portfolios designed to
match exactly Standard and Poor's 500 stock index. Performance studies by AT&T
on outside pension funds found that over the past ten years, only about 20 per cent
had outperformed the index.
75. Full scale analysis involves careful examination of reports filed by corporations with various state and federal regulatory commissions, annual corporate reports
to stockholders, trade journals, government documents, and information gathered
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prices. 76 The implication of these studies is that the high efficiency
of the NYSE makes fruitless the search for securities whose price

differs from intrinsic value.
The security analysis and random-walk hypotheses are clearly at
odds. Although the two theories are generally advanced for the
purpose of testing the viability of investment strategies, they have
conflicting implications for the desirability of the stock market excep-

tion. Security analysis suggests that market price may not reflect the
true or intrinsic value of a share and, accordingly, that the stock

market exception, by relegating the dissenter to the market, does not
guarantee him a true measure of his investment in the corporate

enterprise.

The random-walk theory, on the other hand, suggests

that it is fruitless to seek market profits by attempting to find any

value of a stock independent of its market price. This implies that
the use of security analysis to appraise a stock is inefficacious. The

market has already appraised the stock, and its appraisal is probably
more accurate than that of any court-appointed team, since the

market price reflects the collective judgment of all market participants.
The security analysis and -random-walk theories posit two well-

reasoned, but largely irreconcilable, views of stock market behavior.
With regard to actively traded stocks, however, the statistical evidence
favors the random-walk theory, and documents quite clearly the lack
of consistent success experienced by investors who practice security
analysis. Moreover, the market inefficiencies on which the security
analysts base their theory cannot be accurately counteracted by courtappointed appraisers. These two factors justify placing presumptive
reliance on the market price of an actively traded stock as a measure

of the stock's value."
Still, it is undeniable that many stocks evidence price behavior

that is not easily explained by the random-walk theory. 78 Moreover,
directly from the corporation. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, supra note
53, at 77-84.
76. Sharpe, supra note 73, at 138. In defense of security analysis, it is argued
that professionally managed portfolios administer so large a percentage of all common
stock trading that what happens to the sum of the funds must necessarily happen to
the market as a whole. B. GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 120. Also, it is argued that
any diversified portfolio of securities that is representative of the market as a whole
should fluctuate roughly in the same manner as the general market. S. BOLTEN, supra
note 55, at 353. However, such conclusions probably do not justify practicing
security analysis. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
77. Cf. E. HELFmT, supra note 65, at 101.
78. Traders, investors and security analysts have generally found the random-walk
theory to be unpersuasive. J. CLENDENIN & G. Cimus y, supra note 64, at 261; H.
SAuvAIN, supra note 54, at 169. One would certainly expect reluctance to accept the
random-walk theory in financial circles where analysts' jobs depend on the use of the
opposing security analysis theory. See Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1975, at 16, col. 3. The
objections to the random-walk theory are summarized in S. ROBBINS, supra note 56, at
46.
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there are several important factors, explained below, that may cause
a dissenter who is forced to sell his shares on the market to receive
less than the full value of -the shares. These factors are sufficiently
important and are apt to arise with sufficient frequency to justify
retaining the appaisal remedy in some form for all stocks. The
dissenter who is forced to sell on the market should at least have the

opportunity to prove that, because of some special factor, his sale
brought him, or would have brought him, less than the full value of
the stock.

2.

FactorsAffecting the Dissenter'sRecovery

One special factor that may reduce a dissenter's proceeds from a
market sale is the inability of dissenters who hold large blocks of

stock to dispose of their stock without depressing the market price. 70
Markets for some stocks are deep enough so that large quantities of
the stock can be bought and sold with minimal effect on price.80 But
for many stocks, both listed and over-the-counter, trading is so inactive that a single investor who buys or sells in large quantities can

have a significant impact on the price. 81 In fact, in a number of
instances, the sale of numerous blocks in a short period of time has
79. A finding that block sales may depress the price, a phenomenon commonly
referred to as blockage, does not mean that markets are not efficient, as that term is
used with reference to the rapidity of a price's response to new information. See J.
LoRiE, PUBLIc POLICY FOR AMERCAN CAPrrAL MARuKErs 3 (1974). Blockage refers
to technical problems that prevent the seller from selling at the prevailing price,
irrespective of price accuracy or market efficiency.
Even if the dissenter does not have a large block, the coercion implicit in a
dissenter's sale impairs the accuracy of market price in measuring value. Because of
technical factors, blockage causes price reductions unrelated to value. Theoretically,
a price decline unrelated to value occurs each time a dissenter sells. By definition,
fair market price supposes the interaction of willing sellers and buyers who have
assessed the merits of their investments, and who are under no compulsion to buy or
sell. See In re Dupignae's Estate, 123 Misc. 21, 27, 204 N.Y.S. 273, 276 (Sup. Ct.
1924); Deitch Co. v. Board of Property Assessments, 417 Pa. 213, 209 A.2d 397
(1965); State v. Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d 979, 980 (Comm. App. Tex. 1936). It is true
that the dissenter makes the choice not to accept the corporate action and instead to
sell his stock. However, this does not make the sale voluntary since he has not
decided that the timing of the sale is the most advantageous, but rather has been
forced into selling at this particular time. The free market achieves an equilibrium
price representative of true value because the presence of willing sellers means that
the sale is "voluntary" in the sense that the seller has decided that a present sale
would maximize his profits. When a dissenter is forced to sell, he is given a "now or
never" choice that is dissimilar to the "wait and see" process available to the nondissenter. The dissenter's sale increases supply and lowers the price by an amount
that depends on the number of shares involved. The price is not lowered in response
to the economic realities of the value of the company, but because the dissenter has
no alternative to selling his shares.
80. See Scholes, supra note 72, at 182.
81. See H. SAUvAiN, supra note 54, at 166-67.
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resulted in a large drop in market price, and has even caused the
temporary suspension of trading in the securities involved. 2

A market that is capable of absorbing a block of stock without any
appreciable price decline possesses adequate "liquidity and depth. ' 83
It is difficult to determine, however, what conditions must exist before
a market has sufficient liquidity and depth. The stock exchanges, in
adopting listing and delisting standards, have implicitly defined what
they consider to be the necessary conditions. The exchanges reason
that depth depends to a large degree on the supply of stock in the
hands of the public, and thus the exchanges rely heavily on the

"floating supply" as an important listing criterion.

4

Yet the listing

and delisting standards for the most part have been arbitrarily deter-

mined.85 The listing of a stock on an exchange, therefore, does not

ensure adequate depth.86 "Floating supply" can be a particularly
misleading criterion, since increasing institutionalization has had the
effect of concentrating the shares of many small investors under the

control of a few managers, who make investment decisions on behalf
of their investors. 8 This concentration decreases liquidity and depth
because transactions become more infrequent and irregular, and small

investor participation decreases.
The dissenter who sells a block of shares on a market that lacks

sufficient liquidity and depth must accept a price lower than the
prevailing price.

He thus receives less than the full value of his

shares even if the prevailing market price accurately reflects their full
82. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH 302
(1966).
83. The 1963 SEC Study defined many of the terms commonly used to describe
market charactdristics. In a "continuous" market, each transaction is reasonably
related in price to the prior transaction, with minimum price variations or deviations.
In a "liquid" market, a willing seller is readily able to find a wining buyer. The
extent to which the term implies that a transaction occurs at a price closely related to
intrinsic worth is an open question. "Depth" describes the market for a particular
security by referring to the quantity of buying and selling interest and the potential
activity on each side of the market. Depth is primarily a function of the total
amount of the class of securities outstanding (the "float") and the breadth of
distribution among the general public, exclusive of amounts concentrated in large
blocks. 1963 SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 13-18. See generally Wolfson, Rosenblum & Russo, The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16 How. L.J. 816-19 (1971).
84. See, e.g., 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE
2495B.10, at 4225-26 (1975). See also
1963 SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 828.
85. S.ROBBnS, supra note 56, at 158.
86. Considerable concern continues to exist regarding the maintenance of adequate depth. NYSE rule 104 states that "maintenance of a fair and orderly market
implies the maintenance of price continuity with reasonable depth, and the minimization of the effects of temporary disparity between supply and demand." 2 CCH
NYSE GumE
2104.10, at 2701-5 (1975).
17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.1lb-1 (1975)
demonstrates SEC concern over conditions of market depth. This regulation added
the concept of depth to the obligations of the specialists. SEC SEcUrrIs EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 RELEASn No. 7432 (Sept. 24, 1964).
87. See note 23 supra.

1046

[Vol. 74:1023

Michigan Law Review

value. In such a situation, the investor with a large block can either
accept a severe price penalty in order to effect an immediate sale of

his shares, or he can delay his transaction.18

For the dissenting

shareholder, of course, delay is often not possible, and the price

penalty is the only alternative to becoming a part of the new enterprise.

That "blockage" might often confront the dissenting shareholder is
confirmed by the widely recognized existence of the problem in the
context of valuation practices in tax litigation. In tax valuation, the

principle that the size of a taxpayer's block can be relevant in deciding the value of the stock is firmly established.8 9

In a valuation

proceeding, the taxpayer has the opportunity to demonstrate that the
size of his block of stock is such that it could not be sold at the
prevailing market price, and that he is thereby entitled to pay taxes
based on the value of his stock at some level lower than the prevailing
price. Courts determine this by finding the highest value at which
the stock could be sold if the owner were to liquidate his stock on the

best terms available." Where applied, this formula has resulted in
findings that this "highest value" is below the prevailing market
quotations for shares of stock listed on active exchanges. 0 '

The manner in which large blocks are currently sold demonstrates
that the dissenter usually will have difficulty trying to dispose of such

a block.

Clearly, large blocks are difficult to sell on exchange

auction markets without depressing the prevailing price.92 The most

popular way to dispose of large blocks of securities is to split them
into small units and to sell them over a period of time, which may
extend for several months.93 Block trades do occur frequently in the
88. Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 6, at 2949 (1972).
89. See Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1942); Citizens Fidelity Bank
& Trust Co. v. Reeves, 259 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. App. 1953); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e)
(1958). See generally Wiley, Valuing Large Holdings of Publicly Traded Stocks:
"The Blockage" Problem, 8 INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING

1

74.8 (1974).

90. Bull v. Smith, 119 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1941).
91. See, e.g., Groff v. Munford, 150 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1945) (affirms finding
that sale of block on Montreal Stock Exchange through brokers in a narrow time
period would substantially depress the price); Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d
314 (2d Cir. 1943) (block on over-the-counter market held to be worth less than the
market price); du Pont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246 (1943) (block of 52,900 shares
of 11 million outstanding could not have been sold at prices that would average
quoted prices for the stock on the NYSE, but would be 15 points lower); Bartol v.
McGinnes, 185 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Knobloch v. Smith, 25 F. Supp. 156
(D. Conn. 1938); Florida Natl. Bank v. Simpson, 59 S.2d 751, 767-73 (Fla. 1952).
92. L. WRIorr, PRINCIPLES OF INVESTMENTS: TEXTS AND CASES 57 (1972).
93. S. ROBBINS, supra note 56, at 223, 228; Hearings on the Securities Industry,
supra note 88, at 2950. It has been suggested that spreading a block sale over a long
period of time would depress the price as much as selling the entire block at once,
Calvert v. Kattar, 301 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); SEC, PUBLIC POLICY
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market, but the sellers must either accept a discount from the current
market price or pay a premium to effect the transaction.9 4

Since

many of these block transactions may not be completed for many
months, 95 faster disposition of the stock would require greater dis-

counts or higher premiums. The stock exchanges, recognizing that
the floor sale of a large block can distort the prevailing price, have
developed several alternative mechanisms. 96 While these mechaIMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH 301 (1966). However, a comprehensive study of share repurchasing demonstrates that a number of small-scale
transactions will maintain an orderly market, while a massive transaction will create a
disorderly market. See C. ELLIS & A. YOUNG, Tm REPuRCHASE OF COMMON STOCK
170-76 (1971). The authors found that tender offers dry up the trading volume in
common stock, while open market transactions did not appear to have any noticeable
effect on security trading or volume, or on the depth of the trading market. The
study concluded that, since tender offers having substantial premiums above market
price in order to attract sufficient shares create a disorderly market, a number of
small-scale repurchases are more desirable. It follows that a number of small-scale
sales will not impair the market's orderliness as would one mass sale based on a
substantial reduction in price. See also Wiley, supra note 89, at I 74.800. Contra,
Scholes, supra note 72, discussed in R. BREALEY, SEcurry PRiCES IN A COMPETrIvE
MARKET 81-94 (1971). The Scholes article suggests that those price declines that do
occur are not caused by the inability of an undercapitalized, thin market to digest the
large transaction, but rather are caused by information, implicit in the sale, which is
interpreted to portend bad news. This is further evidence that a dissenter is unable to
obtain the value of his shares unaffected by any appreciation or depreciation caused
by the corporation's action. See notes 107-14 infra and accompanying text. However, it is difficult to accept the view that all stocks possess sufficient depth to absorb
any size transaction. The depth of a stock's market is unique to the particular float;
thus markets in certain stocks may be deep enough to absorb a block, while others
may not. 1963 SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 898. In addition, Scholes' work does
not account for the unique problem facing the dissenter, namely that the dissenter
must dispose of his stock much more quickly than those sellers described in Scholes'
work. Quicker sale must necessarily result in more drastic price behavior as a
consequence of the more rapid increase in the supply.
94. US REPORT at 1819.
95. On the average, only one eighth of a block is sold on the first day, and less
than one half is sold in the first week. Seven per cent generally remains at the
end of the month. Id. at 1821.
96. The most popular mechanism is the secondary distribution, which in recent
years has accounted for over one per cent of NYSE volume. R. BREALEY, supra note
93, at 83. The secondary distribution occurs after trading hours and off the floor of
the exchange. The price generally does not exceed the last sale price of the security
on the floor at the time of the offering. With the approval of the exchange, certain
commissions may be added to the offering price. The seller pays a commission
generally equal to twice the normal rate and the buyer pays no commission. The
exchange distribution involves a group of member firms soliciting enough buy orders
to match a block sell order. The member selling the block pays a special commission
to the members agreeing to solicit purchasers and, in order to stimulate demand, may
also pay the buying commissions.
A second mechanism is the "special offering" of a block at a fixed price for sale
through the facilities of the exchange. The sale price does not exceed the current
price of the security in the regular market and is no lower than the current bid. The
offeror pays a commission to those who accept any part of the offering. The
commissions paid by the offeror are used to recruit a sales force that hopefully will
generate additional demand. The seller also may pay the buying commissions, thus
lowering the buyer's net price. See generally CCH NYSE GUmFD %J 2392-93, at
3667 (1975); Wiley, supra note 89, at 1 74.805.
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nisms do allow the dissenter to dispose of his stock, all involve costs

that decrease the dissenter's actual net recovery,
although not by as
97
much as a sale on the floor of the exchange.

In short, the dissenter with a large block of stock cannot dispose of
his shares on the market without a reduction in its price, and thus
cannot obtain the full value of his interest in the old corporation. Offmarket mechanisms can reduce the loss, but not eliminate it entirely.
The appraisal remedy is a suitable instrument for correcting the
effects of blockage, since a dissenter could demonstrate in an appraisal proceeding -the amount of loss he suffered or would have suffered.

A second problem faces the dissenter whose stocks are listed on a
minor exchange. The stock market exception applies to stock listed
on the regional markets that are registered with the Securities Ex-

change Commission, as well as to those listed on the national markets.
The regional exchanges are distinctly smaller in size98 and probably
97. See Appeal of McNeil, 435 Pa. 553, 556, 257 A.2d 835, 837 (1969) (expert
witness said secondary distribution of a block of stock, the most practical and
economic method to dispose of the shares, would involve six per cent decrease in the
market price of the shares). In the case of a secondary distribution, the average
additional cost to the seller is almost three per cent, R. BREALEY, supra note 93, at
91. It can be argued that the dissenter would have to pay the costs of a block sale at
some point in any event. However, forcing the dissenter to sell his block immediately
deprives him of the opportunity to sell in small quantities on the exchange, thereby
avoiding the additional costs of a large transaction.
98. See note 5 supra. Of the 13 registered exchanges, only nine were trading
common stocks as of July 1, 1976. The Chicago Board of Trade suspended securities trading in March 1971, 39 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1973), the National Stock Exchange folded in January 1975, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1975, at 22, col. 2 (late city
ed.), the Chicago Board Options Exchange has ceased common stock trading, SEC,
35 STAT. BULL. 165 (April 1976), and the Detroit Stock Exchange suspended such
trading on June 30, 1976, Telephone Conversation with spokesman of Detroit Stock
Exchange, July 3, 1976. Of the 11 active exchanges, the NYSE and the AMEX
are the only two that can truly be considered national. The rest help finance local
industries in various geographic areas and provide a market for their securities. The
Regional Stock Exchanges Fight for Survival, 88 FORTUNE 118 (Nov. 1973). The
dominance of the NYSE is evident from the fact that while the number of stocks
traded on the NYSE is substantially less than ten per cent of the total number of
publicly traded shares, the value of the shares is about two-thirds the total value of all
publicly traded shares. J. LoRIE & H. HAMILTON, supra note 55, at 5. Only 0.1 per
cent of all U.S. companies are listed on the NYSE, but preliminary data for 1972
reveals that this small percentage possesses 58.4 per cent of the total assets, 41.9 per
cent of the total sales, and 86.0 per cent of the net income of all U.S. corporations.
1975 NYSE FACr BOOK 34.
For the most part, the regional exchanges serve as a dual market for securities.
About 90 per cent of the stocks traded on the regional exchanges are also listed and
have their primary markets on the NYSE or AMEX. 88 FORTUNE 118 (Nov. 1973).
Almost two thirds of all NYSE stocks are traded on other exchanges. 1963 SEC
STUDY supra note 43, at 1083. Excluding the mining exchanges, 11 per cent of the
stocks on regional exchanges were listed solely on those exchanges. During the two.
month period under study, this 11 per cent accounted for 32.6 per cent of total shares
volume and 7.0 per cent of total dollar volume. Id. at 1084. Though the regional
exchanges currently conduct only a relatively small percentage of total share trading,
as a percentage of dollar volume, the regional exchanges have steadily increased their
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much less efficient than the larger exchanges. In particular, the
regional exchanges are characterized by a lower level of activity and a

lesser number of participants.

Consequently, a seller with even a

moderately sized block may have difficulty selling it on a regional
market. 9 His problems are reduced if his stock is also listed on a
national exchange, but they are by no means eliminated. 0 0 Cognizant of the differences between the regional and national exchanges,
courts have been reluctant to give prices on regionals exclusive weight
in valuation proceedings.' 0 '
trading share. In 1973, total dollar volume of regional trading exceeded 21 billion
dollars, and total trading volume exceeded 652 million shares. 40 SEC ANN. REPS. 158
(1974). As for share volume, the most striking trend is the decline of the smaller
regional exchanges, and a concentration of regional trading in the Midwest Stock
Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the PBW Stock Exchange. The growth in
these three exchanges has sufficed to sustain a general increase in the regional
exchanges' share of dollar volume, even though the three largest regionals do about 90
per cent of the total business of all regional exchanges. See 39 SEC ANN. REP. 155
(1973).
99. Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 82. Specialists are reluctant to make a market on
regionals in the more inactive issues. 1963 SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 949.
100. It is argued that, because of dual listing, most shares listed on regional
exchanges do have a ready market on the national exchange, and therefore differences
between the regional and national markets are not important. It is probable that dual
listing has assisted in the disposition of large blocks because the block can be split and
disposed of in several markets. 1963 SEC STUDY, supra note 43, at 942. Dual
trading has also been in the most active issues with the largest number of shareholders, so that the quality of the market has generally not been impaired. Id. at 941,
949.
However if a large percentage of a particular stock is taken off the NYSE and
traded on a regional, the float on the NYSE in that security is reduced. This
reduction can impair liquidity and depth in that issue and thereby cause inefficiency
in price determination. Thus, dual listing does not guarantee that the seller will
always be able to participate in a deep and liquid market. Id. at 949.
101. See, e.g., Bauman v. Advance Aluminum Castings Corp., 27 Ill. App. 2d 178,
169 N.E.2d 382 (1960), where the court said that market quotations would not be
exclusive even though the stock was listed and traded on the Midwest Stock Exchange. 27 Ill. App. 2d at 182, 169 N.E.2d at 386-87. If Bauman were decided
under a stock-market exception statute, market price would control. However the
court upheld an appraisal value of $11.50 per share, although the market price was
only $8. In Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Rptr.
596 (1960), a dissenter sought appraisal of his widely traded over-the-counter shares
pursuant to a California statute that called for the payment of "fair market value."
The court placed a great deal of reliance on the price established in a broad market,
185 Cal. App. 2d at 774-75, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 602, and stated that the purpose of the
amendments to the California statute making "fair market value" the standard and
giving the court the option to appoint appraisers was to make market price controlling
where a trading market existed. 185 Cal. App. 2d at 771-72, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
Even so, the Gallois court indicated that market quotations would not be conclusive.
If the dissenter were able to provide evidence of manipulation of the market price,
failure of management to disclose inside'information, or errors in market price due to
the effects of the merger, appraisal would be granted. It was the inability of the
dissenter to document an error in the price that the court noted in affirming the use
of market quotations. 185 Cal. App. 2d at 774-75, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 602. The court,
however, rejected the notion of intrinsic value, and indicated that in any case where
the market is fair, market price would be used:
Many writers prefer some other definition [of value], such as our former "fair
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Because regional markets are not active enough to justify exclusive
reliance on price, those who appraise regionally listed stocks should
use security analysis techniques to determine value.

Essentially, the

valuation problem in this situation is no different than the problem of
valuing the stock of a close corporation that lacks a cognizable
market. Of course, the exchange price is evidence of value, which
the appraisers could weight in accordance with the level of market
10 2
activity for the particular stock.'

The stock market exception creates a third difficulty, unrelated to
the problems of fair pricing, for the dissenter who owns restricted
securities.'0 3 A significant number of stocks are placed through
cash value," or as "intrinsic value," or "real value" or "fair value," etc. We do
not know what those terms mean or others like them mean, and we suspect that
the writers who advocate them do not know either. They use them because they
distrust the market as a gauge of value. Yet realistically, under our economic
system, the value of any item of property on any given date, in monetary terms,
is what it can be sold for in a free and fair market.
185 Cal. App. 2d at 774, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
102. The problem of inefficiency on the regional exchanges will be alleviated
when the central market system is adopted. As defined by the SEC, the proposed
central market system will be a nationwide communication system linking together all
elements of the securities marketplace, including all exchanges, national and regional, and the over-the-counter markets. The nationwide system of disclosure will
make data on price and value in all markets universally available and will eliminate
any barriers to participation in any market. SEC, STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET
SYSTEM 11 (1973). Accordingly, the central market should ease the problem of
inadequate depth and liquidity in regional markets, by making these markets part of a
national system tied together by computer. See generally id.; 40 SEC ANN. REP. 7
(1974); J. LoiaE, supra note 79. However, with stocks traded exclusively on regional
markets, the central market will not increase efficiency, since the size of the float will
not change.
103. "The term 'restricted security' is defined to mean securities acquired directly
or indirectly from an issuer, or from a person in a control relationship with such an
issuer (an affiliate) in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public
offering." SEC RELEASE No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L
RPmR. 78,487 at 81,055 (Jan. 11, 1972). The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§
77(e), (f) (1970) requires a corporation that desires to sell its shares to the public to
file a detailed registration statement with the SEC and deliver a prospectus to each
offeree. However, there is an exception from registration for "transactions by an
issuer which do not involve a public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). SEC rule 144 is
intended to clarify the exception to registration that allows issuers to make isolated
sales to a limited number of persons who have sufficient information so that they do
not need the protection of the disclosure requirements of the act. SEC RELEASE No.
5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RPTR.
78,487 at 81,05081,055 (Jan. 11, 1972). Underlying this rule is the concern that the sale might
become the first step in a wider distribution. If that were to occur, the securities
might reach investors who lack the information necessary to make informed investment decisions. Thus, rule 144 attempts to detail the conditions under which resale
of securities originally acquired in a private offering is not considered part of a
distribution.
Registration is expensive; the total costs may range from three per cent of the gross
proceeds in a large offering to nearly 20 per cent of the proceeds in a small one.
Note, Resale of Restricted Securities Under SEC Rule 144, 81 YALE L.J. 1574, 1579
(1972). Private placement of securities, because of this expense and the time
necessary to the investigation for registration, has become an "attractive, if not
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Because

there is often little public information about their underlying value,
the Securities Exchange Commission has limited the quantity of such

shares that can be sold on the market. SEC rule 144, adopted in
1972, states that, for securities listed on a national exchange, the

number of restricted or other securities sold in any six-month period
may not exceed the lesser of two amounts: either one per cent of the

shares outstanding" 5 or "the average weekly reported volume of

trading in such securities on all securities exchanges during the four
calendar weeks" that precede the filing of the required notice of the
proposed sale. 10 6 The effect of this rule is to reduce the liquidity of a
block of stock acquired through a private offering. Because the
dissenter has relatively little time to sell his stock before the enterprise
changes form, any restriction on the amount that can be sold threat-

ens the only recourse a dissenter has under the stock market exception. In this event, the dissenter is precluded from even receiving the

market value of his interest in the corporation. Appraisal and corporate repurchase offer the only feasible alternative to the shareholder.
Any state that chooses to retain some vestige of the stock market
exception should make an accommodation for restricted securities.

A fourth problem is generated by the speed with which the market
place reacts to the news of a major corporate action. 117 Because
appraisal theoretically compensates the dissenter for his share in the
original corporation, 0 8 appraisal statutes are nearly unanimous in

stating that the dissenter is entitled to the value of his shares unafindispensable" instrument for corporations attempting to raise capital. Note, Rule
144: SEC Regulation of Dispositions of Securities by Controlling Persons and
Private Placees, 25 VAND. L. REv. 845, 846 (1972).
104. In 1973, the value of privately marketed issues increased for the third year
in a row, totaling 12.2 billion dollars, a record high. 1.6 billion dollars was placed
privately in 1973, which was 23 per cent higher than in 1972, and four and a half
times greater than in 1971. 1974 NYSE FACT BooK 69. In the period 1960-1963,
over 40 per cent of all new corporate offerings were private placements. S. ROBBINS,
supra note 56, at 171.
105. For purposes of determining the one per cent, both restricted and unrestricted
securities of the same class are aggregated. Thus, this rule applies to any block of
stock, any part of which is restricted.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1)(i) (1975).
107. This concern frequently surfaced in judicial opinions. See, e.g., Vought v.
Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 117 Ohio App. 389, 192 N.E.2d 332 (1962); Application
of Silverman, 115 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1952), modified on appeal, 282 App. Div. 252, 122
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dept. 1953).
108. In many cases, minority shareholders may be paid a premium for their
shares in the old corporation in order to avoid dissent and to facilitate a corporate
action. According to one study, stockholders in acquired corporations in mergers
have received an average premium above the market price of 25 per cent; in one fifth
of the instances, the premium was 50 per cent above market price. R. BREALEY,
supra note 93, at 51; Kipp & Wallum, Acquisitions and Attendant Shareholder Rights,
23 RTTGERS L. REv. 723, 726 (1969). Minority shareholders who accept such offers,
of course, are not dissenters.
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fected by any depreciation or appreciation that might be caused by
the corporate action from which he dissents. 10 9 However, -to the ex-

tent that market price instantaneously reflects new information, a
dissenter cannot sell on the market at a price unaffected by the information implicit in the new corporate action. Obviously, where a major corporate action is considered desirable by analysts, the market
price will adjust itself upward; but where the action is considered
improvident, the price will fall. 1 0 To force the dissenter to sell in a
falling market subjects him to the influence of the corporate action
against which he seeks a remedy."'
Appraisal can control for such abnormal price fluctuations by
using the price that prevailed before the market began to adjust for
the action." 2 To control for the effects of the corporate action, an
appraiser would need to determine at what point information concerning the impending action began to affect the market. The period

evaluated could, in some cases, extend several months prior to the
public announcement."

3

Appraisers could evaluate the degree of the

for other events, and adjust the market
action's impact, controlling
4

price accordingly."1

Finally, there are numerous other factors that can cause the market
price to deviate from the intrinsic value of a share that even appraisal
will often be unable to solve. For example, manipulation of information by insiders of the corporation, 1

5

speculative price movements

109. See, e.g., D.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. Aar §
623(h)(4) (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.72(2) (Supp. 1975).
110. Evidence as to the performance of common stocks of acquiring companies in
mergers, whether measured by price or earnings of the corporation, suggests that
mergers since World War II have not been particularly beneficial to the companies
involved. When compared to other industries, the acquiring corporations have experienced both inferior earnings growth and price declines in their common stock. R.
BREALEY, supra note 93, at 57.
111. See Note, supra note 24, at 1144.
112. Many appraisal statutes attempt to control for the market's anticipation of a
corporate action by using market value the day before the shareholder votes. See
note 2 supra. However, if the studies showing that the market discounts the
corporate action many months before the event are accurate, see note 72 supra, then
discounting one day in advance hardly controls for the effect of the corporate action.
113. See Mandelker, supra note 72; Scholes, supra note 72.
114. A similar analysis is used in assessing damages in some rule lob-5 cases,
where the calculation involves measuring the difference between what was received in
the fraudulent transaction (market price) and the value of what was given up (market
price plus or minus the increment for appreciation or depreciation caused by the
fraudulent practice). R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERjALS 1186 (1972).
115. One rationale for the adoption of securities regulation is that prices of
securities on exchanges and markets are susceptible to manipulation and control,
resulting in unreasonable fluctuations in their price, that consequently hinder proper
appraisal. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(3)
(1970); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). The 1963
SEC STUDY of the securities markets found evidence that corporate public relations
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based on psychological factors." 6 and a parent's manipulation of the
subsidiary's price' 1 7 can all create discrepancies between price and

value. Rule 10b-5 protects the shareholder from fraudulent information when a purchase or sale of the security is involved." 8 Moreover,
departments regularly attempt to increase the price of a company's stock by creating a
favorable investment image, that is only tangentially related to the true status of the
company:
[A]buses of the financial public relations function have become increasingly
evident.. . . The Commission and its staff have become aware of disturbing
signs that public relations consultants and corporate public relations departments
have been used for purposes contrary to the letter and the spirit of the securities
acts .

. .

. Several instances have come to light in which it has appeared that

misleading publicity has directly affected the market price of securities.
1963 SEC STUDy, supra note 43, at 67. The study cited several examples of successful manipulations which increased market price, id. at 67-72, and also showed that
skillful use of a single item of financial publicity can have the effect of depressing a
stock's price to the advantage of majority shareholders. It concluded that "the
motives underlying public relations activity may be of several kinds or may be
mixed. . . . The essential point is that the investor who relies on publicity that is
overenthusiastic or incorrect may be injured, regardless of the purpose of those who
are responsible for it." Id. at 78.
116. See note 62 supra.
117. It has been suggested that control of market price is a serious problem in the
context of the parent-subsidiary merger. Management may have information that is
not disclosed and therefore not reflected in a subsidiary's price, such as an anticipated
increase in the subsidiary's earnings. Judicial emphasis on market price would be
likely to underestimate the future earnings, and thus the value, of the current
enterprise of which the dissenter is a part. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in
Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 305-06 (1974). In
addition, the parent can exert influence that depresses the price of the stock.
Accordingly, any reliance on market price to measure appraisal value reflects the
"cost of the parent's control" in measuring the dissenter's interest. Id. citing In re
Talley Indus., SEC RELEASE No. 5953, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. RPrR. 77,774, at 83,783, 83,792 (Jan. 28, 1970) (rejected use of NYSE price
of stock in evaluation of fairness of proposed merger between two investment
company affiliates in a parent-subsidiary relationship pursuant to section 17(b) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940). Management can control the statement of
earnings, an important factor in appraising value, because of different or inconsistent,
but acceptable, accounting principles. W. CARY, supra note 34, at 1241.
118. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), makes it unlawful "to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit . . . a material fact necessary in order to make statements
not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1975). Thus, false predictions of earnings, misstatements in
earnings reports, false news, or news omitting a material fact that produces misleading result, or any misleading statement designed to depress or raise the price of a
stock is within the scope of rule lOb-5. 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw 143-62
(1954). This remedy can protect the dissenter from any unfairness in market price
caused by fraudulent insider behavior. Regardless of whether a state appraisal statute
is the exclusive remedy, courts will entertain rule lOb-5 actions as a matter of overriding federal law. Rights and remedies available under rule lOb-5 are "in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or equity." 15 U.S.C. §
78bb(a). Thus, where a shareholder alleges a violation of the rule and thereafter
demands an appraisal as provided by state law, the shareholder is not making an
election of remedies that bars his suit under lOb-5. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc.,
No. 75-7256 (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 1976), at 1949; Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). Rule 10b-5 requires a purchase or sale of
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if the misleading information rises to the level of "fraud" or "bad

faith," most states allow an equitable remedy, even if appraisal is
otherwise an exclusive remedy for a corporate action.' 10 All of these
problems, though, are based on an absence of information or on

inaccurate information. If the shareholder can do so, he should have
the opportunity to demonstrate that the market price has been improperly influenced by such factors and that it consequently does not
reflect intrinsic value. In most cases, however, appraisers will be
unable to discover information in an appraisal proceeding that has
been unavailable to the market as a whole.

In these situations,

market price, though incorrect, may be the best available indication
of value.
3.

JudicialApproachesToward Stock Valuation

The unreliability of market price as an exclusive determinant of
value is strongly supported by the judicial approaches toward stock
valuation. Since the turn of the century, courts have used a variety of

analytical approaches to value shares, 120 and have been attracted to
the standard of market value because of its easy application.121 Yet,
-the decisions as a whole demonstrate a general reluctance to rely
exclusively on market price in determining value.
In the early twentieth century, some courts used market price

exclusively, when it seemed fair, on the ground that it reflected the
opinion of those informed about the value of the company in ques-

tion.' 22 But courts at this time commonly believed that a share of
securities. For purposes of the rule, securities are considered purchased and sold in
mergers, consolidations, and sale of assets for securities. SEC v. National Sec.
Co., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). If successful, the dissenter suing under lOb-5 in an action
based on price manipulation would receive the difference between the value of what
he gave up and what he received in the transaction. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra
note 114, at 1186. Furthermore, minority shareholders could get an injunction
halting the actions depressing market price. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco
Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967).
119. Note, supra note 22, at 115, 119-20.
120. For a survey of the various factors considered in appraising closely held and
publicly held stock, see Note, Valuation of Dissenter's Stock Under Appraisal
Statutes, 79 HARv.L. Rnv. 1453 (1966).
121. See Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904) (dissenters
entitled to "market value," but no indication of what market value is based on). See
also American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 F. 896, 902 (6th Cir. 1923); Jackson Co.
v. Gardiner Inv. Co., 217 F. 350 (1st Cir. 1914), appeal dismissed, 239 U.S. 628
(1915).
122. See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928),
where the court attempted to value minority shares to determine whether the sale of a
corporation's assets was at a fraudulently low price. The court stated that, although
market price is influenced by many conditions and hence may not be exclusively
relied upon, it is more likely to reflect the actual worth of the company's assets than
book value, "since [market price] is subject to constant revision and is the consensus
of financial opinion as expressed by those best informed while engaged in the

April 19761

Stock Market Exception

1055

stock represented a portion of the corporation's assets. They there-

fore rejected market price when it fell below asset values, and sought
to determine a value apart from market price.'

The stock market plunge that began in October 1929 shook public

confidence in the protection capabilities of the free market.' 2 4 In
response, courts in the 1930's gave less or even no weight to market
price' 25 and began to look to other factors, such as those used in

competitive selling and buying of the assets of the corporation." 155 Md. at 81, 141
A. at 432. See also In re Capital Stock of Morris Canal & Banking Co., 104 NJ.L.
526, 141 A. 784 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
123. See, e.g., Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504, 512-13, 113 N.E. 189, 191 (1916)
("It is obvious that 'the value of the stock' means not merely the market price if the
stock is traded in by the public, but the intrinsic value, to determine which all the
assets and liabilities must be ascertained"); Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa.
142, 124 A. 302, 304 (1924) (dissenters "entitled to receive the real, actual value of
their shares. . . market value does not measure this real, actual value").
Tax valuations prior to the depression also reflected a belief held by some courts
that market price should not necessarily be decisive of a stock's value. In Heiner v.
Crosby, 24 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1928), the court rejected the use of market quotations
on the Pittsburgh Stock Exchange to determine the amount of income tax on the sale
of stock and upheld the lower court's findings on intrinsic value. The court stated
that market price may be significant but not decisive and that "peculiar or unusual
circumstances, such as sales of small lots, forced sales, and sales in a restricted
market" could so disturb a market as to make the prevailing price unreliable. 24 F.2d
at 193. Contra, Klein v. Jefferson City Bd. of Tax Super., 230 Ky. 182, 18 S.W.2d
1009 (1929), affd. on other grounds, 282 U.S. 19 (1930).
The techniques used in valuing stock for federal estate or gift tax purposes have
been regarded as inapplicable for the appraisal of dissenters' shares, since in a tax
valuation the owner of the stock does not part with his investment, while in appraisal,
the stockholder surrenders his opportunity to share in the future growth of the
company. Additionally, in tax valuation the corporation is not affected by the
outcome, while in appraisal, the corporation's interests are directly involved. Note,
supra note 120, at 1455. Tax valuation, however, is not irrelevant to appraisal, for
the tax decisions give insight into judicial attitudes toward particular valuation
standards. It is arguable whether courts attach any significance at all to the
distinction between tax valuation and appraisal valuation. See Clark v. City of
Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 400, 143 A. 677, 681 (1928) ("assessment" refers to official
valuation of property for tax purposes, and is synonymous with the word "appraisal"
used in the stock appraisal statute). Moreover, because the consequences of appraisal
involve the exchange of property for cash and are hence more severe than tax
valuation, the standards used in appraisal should be more accurate. Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1974). Thus, if
a tax court performing a tax valuation rejects a standard on grounds of inaccuracy or
unfairness, the standard should be even more closely scrutinized before being employed to appraise the dissenter's shares.
124. See, e.g., B. REIS, FALSE SEcury 260-72 (1938).
125. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934),
where dissenters to a merger sought appraisal under the Delaware statute. The
appraisers used the closing market quotations of the stock on December 20, 1932, and
the court stated:
When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts upon the value of the
stock of an active corporation as evidenced by its daily quotations, is an accurate, fair reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than a moment's reflection
is needed to refute it. There are too many accidental circumstances entering
into the making of market prices to admit them as sure and exclusive reflectors
of fair value. The experience of recent years is enough to convince the most
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security analysis. 126 The extremely erratic market of the Depression
stabilized after World War II, and showed a sustained period of

over-all improvement in prices.127 In this new period, courts demonstrated greater willingness to use market price as a determinant of

value, but declined to use it exclusively in most cases on the ground
that circumstances could exist that would compel modification or

rejection of market quotations.128 Courts, for instance, indicated that
casual observer that the market in its appraisal of values must have been woefully wrong in its estimates at one time or another within the interval of a
space of time so brief that fundamental conditions could not possibly have become so altered as to affect true worth. Markets are known to gyrate in a single
day.
20 Del. Ch. at 150, 172 A. at 455. Accord, Ames v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 229
App. Div. 858, 243 N.Y.S. 798, affd., 256 N.Y. 676, 177 N.E. 189 (1931), discussed
in Robinson, DissentingShareholders: Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation of
Their Shares, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 62, 72 (1932). See Republic Fin. & Inv. Co. v.
Fernstermaker, 211 Ind. 251, 254-55, 6 N.E.2d 541, 542 (1937).
126. At approximately the same time that courts were looking at a variety of
factors in appraisal, the first edition of SECURmT ANALYSIS was released. See B.
GRAHAM & D. DODD, S-cunrr ANALYSiS (1934). The judicial approach was similar
to that of these authors. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931).
There the court, in dictum, recognized that market quotations may rise or fall as a
result of a proposed corporate action and stated that "[miarket quotations are,
therefore, to be considered only in so far as they reflect a reasonable basis for
estimating market quotations which would probably have continued if a sale had not
been made." 257 N.Y. at 493, 178 N.E. at 768. Factors identical to those employed
in security analysis-dividend rate, regularity of dividend payment, management, and
future prospects-were believed to affect market price but were not necessarily
accurately reflected in the price. 257 N.Y. at 493, 178 N.E. at 768. The court also
recognized that in certain circumstances a corporation in the open market would
possess the ability to depress artificially the stock's price. 257 N.Y. at 494, 178 N.E.
at 768-69. As for the corporation that faced the prospect of paying the dissenter
more than the market price, the court said "[tihe payment of such actual value, even
if more than the market quotation, is the price that must be paid by the corporation
for the privilege of requiring a sale over the protest of the dissenting stockholders who
are in effect being ousted from the corporation." 257 N.Y. at 494, 178 N.E. at 76869.
For the judicial approach to tax valuation during the depression, see Rogers v.
Strong, 72 F.2d 455, 457 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 621 (1934) (rejected
market quotations); Universal Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 118 N.J.L. 538,
193 A. 915 (1937), affd., 120 N.J.L. 185, 198 A. 836 (1938), affd., 307 U.S. 313
(1939) (theory that market price is "the invariable test of true value under all
circumstances" was rejected; "market value is a workable, but not an invariable test of
true value. 'It [market value] is nothing more than a convenient index and evidence
of true value under ordinary and normal conditions'"); State v. West Point Mfg. Co.,
236 Ala. 467, 469, 183 S.449, 451 (1938).
127. See note 65 supra.
128. Although the New York courts relied heavily on market price, their decisions
recognized the possibility that in certain circumstances market price may not be
reliable. See, e.g., In re Behrens, 61 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1946), a!Id., 271 App.
Div. 1007, 69 N.Y.S.2d 910 (indicated weight given market price is a function of the
nature and extent of the market); Jones v. Healy, 184 Misc. 923, 55 N.Y.S.2d 349
(Sup. Ct. 1945), affd., 370 App. Div. 895, 62 N.Y.S.2d 605, appeal denied, 270 App.
Div. 998, 64 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1946); In re Shipway, 29 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1941)
(rejected the use of market quotations; court was influenced by the fact that market
price had been bid upward by the prospect of a merger).
In In re Marcus, 191 Misc. 808, 77 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.), modified on appeal,
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market price would be used only when the market was an active,
deep, and fair exchange reflecting the judgment of voluntary buyers
273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1st Dept. 1948), affd., 302 N.Y. 881, 100 N.E.
2d 55 (1951), a very deep and active market existed for the shares in question. On
appeal, the court noted that the nature of the market would justify using the prevailing quotations as the appraisal value: "Market value is the controlling consideration
where there is a free and open market and the volume of the transactions and
conditions make the market a fair reflection of the judgment of the buying and selling
public. Nearly all the cases in which other factors have been given much weight have
been cases where the market was not sufficiently broad or established to be accepted
as representative." 273 App. Div. at 727, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The court noted that
the petitioner had not suggested any infirmity in the market which could impair the
validity of the prevailing market price. 273 App. Div. at 728, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
While generally accepting market price, the court indicated that appraisers were not
confined to this single standard but could take other factors into consideration. 273
App. Div. at 730-31, 79 N.Y.S.2d at 81. See also In re Deutschmann, 281 App. Div.
14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dept. 1952) (court held that the dissenters' failure to
accept AT&T's offer to buy their stock at a price a fraction above the prevailing
NYSE market price was arbitrary, vexatious, and in bad faith. Thus, the court
required the stockholders to assume the costs of the proceeding; the court indicated
that the stock had a value equal to its price on the market, 281 App. Div. at 19, 116
N.Y.S.2d at 582); accord, Leighton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 397 F.
Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Kaufmann, Alsberg & Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 468,
222 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (1961); Tabulating Card v. Leidesdorf, 32 Misc. 2d 720, 723,
223 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Dynamics Corp. of America v. Abraham &
Co., 5 Misc. 2d 652, 166 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dictum). See also
Application of Silverman, 115 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1952), modified on appeal, 282
App. Div. 252, 122 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dept. 1953) (dictum) (court indicated that
market price on a listed exchange could be of great significance, but expressed
concern that market price may not reflect the true value of the dissenter's stock as a
part of the old enterprise unaffected by the proposed corporate action).
Delaware was the first state to adopt the stock-market exception rule, thereby
making market price the exclusive determinant of value. It is ironic then that
decisions in Delaware in the post World-War II era recognized considerations that
would require national securities exchange prices to be adjusted. See, e.g., TriContinental v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (1950) (dictum) (court explained
that value under the Delaware appraisal statute means the "true or intrinsic value" of
the stock, which involves many factors and elements, such as market price, asset
value, dividends, earnings prospects, etc.; market value may not be taken as the sole
measure of the value of the stock); In re General Realty & Util. Corp., 29 Del.
Ch. 480, 52 A.2d 6 (1947) (in accordance with earlier Delaware decisions that
weighted a variety of factors in determining the value of stock in close corporations,
the court, even though the stock was listed on the NYSE, weighted asset value at 50
per cent, and arrived at an appraisal value higher than market price); Jacques Coe &
Co. v. Minneapolis Moline Co., 31 Del. Ch. 368, 75 A.2d 244 (1950); see also Levin
v. Midland-Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (1963).
Decisions in other states prior to the advent of the stock market exception rule
generally follow the analysis in the New York and Delaware decisions. See, e.g.,
Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1960)
(price on over-the-counter market exclusive, unless dissenter could provide evidence
of abnormality; rejected notion of intrinsic value); Bauman v. Advance Aluminum
Castings Corp., 27 Ill. App. 2d 178, 169 N.E.2d 382 (1960) (price on Midwest Stock
Exchange not exclusive); General Grain v. Goodrich, 140 Ind. App. 100, 221 N.E.2d
696 (1967) (dictum); Robbins v. Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 67 N.W.2d 12 (1954)
(dictum) (court reluctant to use "the gyrations of the stock market as a conclusive
measure of value"); Martignette v. Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 163 N.E.2d 9
(1959) (dictum) (under ideal conditions, market price reflects all aspects of value,
but certain conditions may cause market price to be inaccurate); Bache & Co. v.
General Inv. Corp., 42 N.J. 44, 198 A.2d 759 (1964) (sustained the use of stock
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and sellers.1 2 9 The decisions of the post-World War II period were

of two types: those that rejected market price and analyzed a variety
of factors to determine intrinsic value; 8 0 and those decisions that
rejected intrinsic value, presumed the accuracy of market price, and
allowed shareholders to refute the accuracy of the market price by

demonstrating the existence of abnormal factors.18 '
By adopting the stock market exception, legislatures implicitly
expressed considerable confidence in market valuations. Despite this
expression of legislative confidence, courts in recent years have been
unwilling to abandon the theories of valuation developed in the postWorld War II era. For example, the Delaware chancery court refused to use market price as an exclusive determinant in a 1968 case,
In re Olivetti-Underwood,12 that arose after the enactment of the
Delaware stock market exception but before its effective date. 8 8
market quotations as the determinant of value; however, if market price reflected the
effects of the corporate change to which the dissenter objected, market price would be
adjusted); In re Paterson & Hudson R.R., 11 N.J. 403, 94 A.2d 657 (1953);
Dickinson v. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 396, 106 A.2d 607 (1954) (allowed
limited appraisers' inquiry of those factors that "prevent the market price from
reflecting the full market value . . ."); Jeffrey v. American Screw Co., 98 R.I. 286,
201 A.2d 146 (1964) (court indicated an actively traded stock could have a value
equal to the market price, but left the option open in appraisal to show a market
abnormality); contra, Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 220 Md. 478, 154 A.2d 796
(1959) (price on PBW Exchange exclusive).
Ohio differs from all other states in statutorily defining the value of a share as
"the amount a willing seller under no compulsion to sell, would be willing to accept,
and which a willing buyer, under no compulsion to purchase, would be willing to
pay," Omo RE,. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(C) (Page Supp. 1975). By statute, the actual
market price is evidence of market value, and the weight attached to market price
depends on the nature of the market. The actual market conditions are therefore
subject to any evidence which can be used to determine value. In Vought v.
Republic-Franklin Ins. Co., 117 Ohio App. 389, 24 Ohio Ops. 168, 192 N.E.2d 332
(1962), the court stated that in most cases where there was active trading on the
NYSE, price would probably be conclusive.
129 See cases cited in notes 130, 131 infra.
130. See, e.g., Tri-Continental v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (1950);
Jeffrey v. American Screw Co., 98 R.I. 286, 201 A.2d 146 (1964).
131. See, e.g., Gallois v. West End Chem. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 765, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 596 (1960); Dickinson v. Fire Assn. of Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 396, 106 A.2d
607 (1954).
132. 246 A.2d 800 (Del. Ch. 1968).
133. The merger occurred in 1963, so the revised Delaware Corporation Law of
1967 did not apply. Even so, under the 1967 revision, the dissenters still would have
possessed appraisal rights. Olivetti acquired over 90 per cent of Underwood's stock
and would have been able to execute a short-form merger under DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 253(a) (1975). The owners of shares not owned by Olivetti would have
received notice of the merger from Olivetti under section 253 (d). Under the revised
law, an objecting shareholder can demand payment for the value of his shares,
excluding any element of value arising from the expectation or accomplishment of the
merger. If the dissenter and the corporation do not agree on value, the dissenter can
demand appraisal, described in sections 262(d) to 262(j). The stock market exception is in section 262(k); therefore, any shareholder whose stock would otherwise be
denied appraisal by section 262(k) is entitled to appraisal if the merger is carried out
pursuant to section 253.
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Although the apparent market for the stock was sufficiently broad to
34
fit within the exception, the court concluded that the market price
3
8
was unreliable,
and hence accorded the market value a weight of
only fifty per cent in determining the final value of the stock.' 3 6 The
philosophy of the stock market exception, of which the court was no
doubt aware, was ignored in lieu of other factors believed to offer a
more accurate estimate of the fair value of the stock.
An attempted merger in 1971 between Glen Alden Subsidiary
Corporation and Schenley Industries gave rise to two Delaware decisions that show a similar reluctance to rely upon market price as an
exclusive measurement of value when the stock market exception is
inapplicable.

In Greene v. Schenley Industries, Inc.,13 7 a minority

shareholder in Schenley sought to enjoin the merger because of the
alleged unfairness of the proposed exchange of Schenley common
stock, which was traded on the NYSE, for debentures and cash.' 38 In
valuing the Schenley stock to determine the fairness of the consideration, the court indicated that market price was to be given great
weight, and relied upon the market's performance in 1970 to establish the plan's fairness. The court noted in passing, however, that the
market price during portions of 1967 and throughout 1968 was not
an accurate reflection of Schenley's true worth, since competing takeover proposals had inflated the price. 30 The court thereby indicated
that, had the case arisen at that time, it would have looked to other
factors to determine the value of the stock. The injunction was
ultimately denied, and an appraisal of the dissenter's shares occurred.
134. The Underwood stock was traded on the NYSE until July 2,- 1963, when it
was delisted, but about 2000 stockholders continued to trade over the counter until
the merger occurred on October 23, 1963. 246 A.2d at 801-02.
135. 246 A.2d at 805.
136. 246 A.2d at 809. The court weighed three factors in calculating the intrinsic
value of the stock-earnings ($0) at 25 per cent; market value ($14.25) at 50 per
cent; assets ($10.62) at 25 per cent-and arrived at a value per share of $9.78. This
value was lower than the market price, which is not surprising since Olivetti bid up
Underwood's stock in the acquisition attempt. Interestingly enough, the value per
share after the court applied its methodology was only slightly higher than the merger
date bid market price of $9.50. 246 A.2d at 803.
137. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
138. Such an exchange would not fall under the stock market exception rule even
if the plaintiff had been seeking appraisal instead of an injunction. The Delaware
statute eliminates appraisal only where the shares received as well as the shares

surrendered are listed on a national securities exchange or are otherwise actively
traded. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1975). Contrast MicH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 450.1761(a) (1973), which denies appraisal when either the shares received
in consideration or the shares surrendered satisfy the national securities exchange
requirement. Michigan reasons that the Delaware requirement is unnecessary because the dissenter in either case can still sell his stock, because the dissenter assumes
the risk of a decrease in value as a result of majority action, and because the minority
has other remedies, presumably injunctive relief, if the terms of the merger are unfair.
Comment to MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(761)(a) (1974).
139. 281 A.2d at 34.
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In Gibbons v. Schenley Industries,140 the dissenters returned to
court to challenge the conclusions of the appraiser's report. The
appraiser weighted market value at thirty-five per cent, earnings value
at forty-five per cent, and asset value at twenty per cent in arriving at
a fair value of $43.87 for the common stock, considerably 'higher
than the $29 market price for the stock prevailing on the date of the
merger. In Gibbons, the court believed that market price should be
given greater weight, 14' and cited the 1967 adoption of the stock
market exception for support. However, even though there was a
market price available as of the merger date, the court did not rely on
it exclusively, but instead weighted market price at fifty-five per cent
and earnings at forty-five per cent, and calculated a fair value of
$39.79 for each share. By rejecting market price as an exclusive
the theovalue determinant, the Gibbons court implicitly disaffirmed
1 42
retical underpinnings of the stock market exception.
In sum, the contention that appraisal affords dissenting shareholders no benefit that sale on the market could not provide ignores the
realities of market pricing and the barriers to a dissenter's participation in the market. Unquestionably the stock market exception
places many dissenting shareholders in a dilemma from which they
can escape, if at all, only by suffering a considerable loss on the
disposition of their stock.
Once it is determined that dissenters cannot always receive adequate compensation for their shares by selling on the market, the
proponents of the stock market exception can make one final argument-that the appraisal remedy is too costly and too conducive to
vexatious suits to justify the benefit it confers on shareholders who
hold listed or widely held securities. It is to this contention that the
following subsection is directed.
B.

The Costs of Appraisal

Like all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, appraisal of a
dissenter's shares can be costly. In weighing the impact of this
problem, however, two considerations must be kept in mind. First,
140. 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975).
141. Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934), see note 125
supra, was minimized as being "a case decided in an atmosphere of severely depressed
market values of corporate shares of stock on a scale much more extreme than that
339 A.2d at 467.
being experienced now ......
142. The fact that nonmarketable securities were being offered in exchange
should not have affected what standard was used to appraise the shares. See note 138
supra. The stock-market exception is based on the assumption that market price is
accurate and can be used as an exclusive determinant of value. Regardless of the
consideration offered in the exchange, the dissenter is being compensated for his
interest in the old corporation, and the value of his interest should still be the market
price. See Micm. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1761(a) (1973), discussed in note 138
supra.
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the costs of appraisal are apt to generate vexatious suits, or alternatively to stifle meritorious claims, only if the costs are consistently
imposed on one of the parties, because it is only then that the cost
factor will increase the bargaining power of one party over the other.
Second, the costs are incurred only if an appraisal actually takes
place. If the appraisal statute is framed to encourage pre-appraisal
settlement, and if the substantive factors used by appraisers to reach
decisions are sufficiently clear to enable the parties reasonably to
predict the outcomes, appraisal proceedings may rarely occur.
Current appraisal procedures are reasonably conducive to preappraisal settlement and, with some minor modifications, can be
made even more so. Most state statutes assess the costs of appraisal
14 3
against the corporation so long as the dissenter acts in good faith.
This practice has not generated a significant number of vexatious
suits, 1 44 and generally appears to comport with the stronger equitable
position of the shareholder, who must turn to appraisal to receive the
protection forgone by the elimination of his common-law right to
enjoin the corporate action. 145 However, most states also allow the
court to apportion the costs of the proceeding between the parties if
the conduct of the parties renders it appropriate. 1 46 Meaningless
suits are discouraged by the fact that a dissenter who presents a claim
in bad faith can have the full costs of the proceeding assessed against
him. The same prospect encourages the corporation to cooperate in
the proceeding, to make fair settlement offers, and to avoid actions
that might depress the price of the stock. Thus, the prospect of
having fees assessed against them encourages both parties to arrive at
a pre-appraisal settlement.
One possible argument against this cost apportionment scheme is
that a dissenter who is forced to assume some share of the costs will
receive less than the full value of his shares.' 47 But this argument
has little force, since a dissenter will incur costs generally only if he
acts in bad faith. Moreover, it is hardly unique to the appraisal
143. See, e.g., ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. fit. 13-A, § 909.9.(H) (1973); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAw. § 623(h)(7) (McKinney 1963); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-75(f) (Supp.

1975).
144. Although isolated instances of shareholder harassment of the corporation can
be found, see In re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S.2d 76, rehearing and appeal
denied, 274 App. Div. 822, 81 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1948), the nuisance value of appraisal
actions is relatively small.

N. LA=N, THE LAW OF CORPORAONS 592 (2d ed.

1971). Most criticism of appraisal has focused on its high cost to the user and its
overly complicated procedures. See Manning, supra note 20, at 233. Cf. Waite v.
Old Tucson Dev. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 517, 528 P.2d 1276 (1974). This criticism, if
valid, suggests that stockholders would not bother to use this inconvenient procedure
in bad faith or for purposes of harassment.
145. Pierce, supra note 15, at 156-57.
146. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-

113(e) (1975). See also A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:131(G) (West 1969).
147. Pierce, supra note 15, at 155.
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context that an individual must incur expenses in order to assert a
legal claim. In any event, transaction costs connected with selling
stock on the market pursuant to the stock market exception also
prevent the shareholder from receiving full value.
Pre-appraisal settlement is also encouraged by procedures that
facilitate bargaining between the corporation and the dissenter. All
appraisal statutes require that some effort be made by the corporation
and the stockholder to agree on a price without going to court. 48
For example, the New York statute places an affirmative burden on
the corporation to make an offer to the dissenter. 49 If the parties
reach no agreement based on this offer, then procedures are initiated
whereby the values are determined by the court or by the appraisers. 15 0 If no agreement has been reached due to the bad faith of
either side, costs and expenses may be imposed on the recalcitrant
party,',' and interest to the shareholder may be denied.' 5 2 Proposed
amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act require the
dissenter who disagrees with the corporation's offer to demand a
supplemental payment.' 53 The Act assigns costs to the corporation, but grant the court discretion to impose them on the dissenter
after considering various factors relevant to his good faith. 5 4
In any legal context, parties are most likely to reach a settlement if
the substantive law is well defined and the parties can reasonably
predict the outcome of the litigation. Although this proposition is no
less true in the appraisal context than elsewhere, appraisal proceedings have long possessed an unpredictableness that encourages further
litigation. Clarification of the substantive considerations that are
regularly to enter into the appraisal of shares would substantially
reduce the incidence of actual resort to the appraisal remedy, and
would thereby reduce the costs a shareholder must incur in exercising
his legal rights.
One way of clarifying the substantive law of appraisal in the
context of widely traded stocks is, as noted above, 155 to place a
148. Id. at 147.
149. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(g) (McKinney Supp. 1975). The offer must
be accompanied by a balance sheet giving information about the corporation's value.
150. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(h) (McKinney 1963).
151. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(h)(7) (McKinney 1963).
152. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(h)(6) (McKinney 1963).
153. SUBCOMMITTEE, PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF AMENDMENTS

TO MODEL Bus.

CORP. AcT §§ 73, 80, 81 (Nov. 17, 1975) at 21; SuBcoMMrrrEE, PRELIMINARY
DRAFTS OF AMENDMENTS TO §§ 79, 80 and 81 of the MODEL Bus. CORP. Aar (Feb.
11, 1976) at 13.

154. Such factors could include whether the corporation made an offer, or the
amount by which the corporation's offer fell below, or the dissenter's demand exceeded, fair value. SUBCOMMITTEE, PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF AMENDMENTS TO
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 73, 80, 81 (Nov. 17, 1975) at 23.
155. See text at notes 77, 78 supra.
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presumption of accuracy on the market price and to allow the dissenter to show what special factors, if any, distorted the accuracy of the
market valuation. A statute or court decision that limited the dissenter to showing the existence and effect of these factors would substantially eliminate the inequities of the stock market exception, while
streamlining the appraisal process considerably.1 56
II.

CONCLUSION

Several modified forms of the stock market exception have been
proposed in an effort to reduce the inequities of the exception as157it
exists in most states. California has adopted one such proposal
that limits the exception to those exchanges that have been certified
by the state Commissioner of Corporations. By wisely exercising his
discretion, the Commissioner can presumably exclude those regional
exchanges that are characterized by market thinness and by other
problems of inefficiency. The new law also provides that only holders of those over-the-counter stocks on the list compiled by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System will be denied appraisal.
This provision is designed to keep thinly traded stocks from falling
within the exception. Also excluded are securities restricted by any
federal or state law or regulation. Moreover, appraisal is granted if
five per cent or more of the shares dissent. This provision attempts
to mitigate the inability of dissenters to sell their shares without
depressing the market price. The choice of the five per cent figure is
arbitrary, since the depressive effect of a particular sale depends on a
variety of factors unrelated to the amount of the dissenter's stock. For
example, the level of activity in the stock is relevant; if a large
percentage of the float is held in long-term investment portfolios, or if
the volume of trading is evenly dispersed among the various exchanges, a sale of considerably less than five per cent might depress
the market price.
The innovative California statute reduces some of the harshness of
the stock market exception, but it suffers from one shortcoming that
is inherent in any version. The dissenter who fits within the rule still
must sell his shares on a market that has already reacted to the
corporate action to which he dissents. Thus, the California statute
fails to give the dissenter the full value of his interest in the original
156. Some courts have utilized appraisal in this manner. See, e.g., Martignette v.
Sagamore Mfg. Co., 340 Mass. 136, 163 N.E.2d 9 (1959) (dictum); Bache & Co. v.
General Inv. Corp., 42 N.J. 44, 198 A.2d 759 (1964); In re McKinney, 116 N.Y.S.2d
375, revd. on other grounds, 280 App. Div. 723, 117 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1952), affd., 306
N.Y. 207, 117 N.E.2d 256 (1954).
The Ohio statute has been construed to produce this result. See note 128 supra.
The Oklahoma statute appears to require this result. See note 3 supra. See generally
note 128 supra.
157. See note 5 supra.
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corporation when the corporate action is improvident. Intuitively, it
would seem that protecting the original investment of the dissenter
while allowing the majority to make the decisions is a fair resolution
of the competing interests of the minority and the corporation's
management. Moreover, if legislatures desire to encourage investment as a matter of public policy, they should protect investors from
being unnecessarily surprised by changes in the nature and value of
their investments. Giving the dissenter the value of his interest in the
old corporation minimizes surprises and thereby creates an environment conducive to investment.
Another alternative, which was considered and rejected by the
Law Review Commission of Michigan, is to eliminate appraisal for a
listed security only where the market price falls by less than a stated
percentage (the Michigan figure was twenty-five per cent) during the
interval between the announcement of the corporate action and the
record date for voting.158 There are several problems with this
alternative. If the market anticipates the action even before it is
publicly announced and adjusts its price at that time, any measurement
of the reduction in the post-announcement period is meaningless.
Furthermore, even a twenty-five per cent drop in price is a considerable loss for the dissenter to bear. On the other hand, any reduction
in the percentage that the market price must fall to trigger appraisal
would tend to grant appraisal even when price reductions resulted
from factors unrelated to the dissent.
Another suggested modification in the appraisal mechanism provides for an arbitration proceeding that does not directly involve a
court. 15 91 As envisaged, however, arbitration hardly differs from an
appraisal proceeding where the appraisers have absolute authority to
determine value. Though arbitration is often thought advantageous
because it saves the expense of a court proceeding and takes less time,
it is doubtful that arbitration in the appraisal context has any of these
benefits. A court expends little time in appointing a panel of experts
to appraise the stock and in entertaining exceptions; appeals from
arbitration decisions may be equally time-consuming. 60 Moreover,
the expenses of assembling and presenting evidence would be substantially the same in either context.
Any statute that requires the dissenter to sell on the market risks
depriving the dissenter of the full value of his shares. Accordingly, a
statute should allow a panel of experts to adjust the market price in a
proceeding that avoids placing intolerable burdens on either party. A
158. Siegel, The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation Act, 4 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 161, 177 (1970).
159. See SUBCOMMIMTTE, REPORT OF PROGRESS AND REQUEST FOR INsTRUanONS 3
(Sept. 8, 1975).
160. Cf. MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 769.9 to .10.
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modified appraisal procedure appears to offer maximum utility.
Shareholders should be required to object to the proposed corporate
action before or during the meeting at which the vote on the action is
taken, so that the corporation has adequate notice of the dissent' 61
and of the number of shares that might have to be repurchased.
Shortly after the corporate action is approved, the shareholder should

also be required to make an irrevocable demand for payment. A valid

concern is that the dissenter might be able to press the corporation for
a favorable payment while leaving himself the option of selling his
shares on the market if the price should rise. This possibility can be

avoided by requiring the shareholder to surrender his shares to the
corporation as evidence of his intention to dissent.16 2 After the dissenter surrenders his shares, the corporation should be required either to
determine the fair value of the shares and pay the dissenter that value
in cash,' 63 or to return the shares to6 4the dissenter, with instructions

that he must sell them on the market.'

Whether the shares are repurchased or sold on the market, the

shareholder should be allowed to demand a supplemental payment if
he questions the corporation's determination of the value or the value
he received by selling on the market. If the corporation and the
shareholder cannot agree on the amount of the supplemental pay-

ment, an appraisal proceeding would be held to determine the pro161. This is the current position of the Model Business Corporation Act. See 2
Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. § 81 (1969).
162. The Model Business Corporation Act currently provides that if the proposed
corporate action is approved by a vote of the shareholders, the shareholders have ten
days in which to make an irrevocable demand for payment. See 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. § 81 (1969), at %2.
A proposed revision to the Model Act requires the dissenter to surrender his
shares within 20 days if the proposed corporate action is passed. This informs the
corporation at an early date of how many shareholders are dissenting. It also avoids
the possibility of dissenters selling their shares to speculators hoping to profit on
developments in the subsequent course of the appraisal proceeding. SurBcoMMrrTE,
PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF AMENDmENTS TO §§ 79, 80 and 81 OF ThE MODEL Bus.
CORP. AcT (Feb. 11, 1976) at 12, 17.
Moreover, even if the dissenter sold or assigned his interest in a share to a third
party after surrender, so long as the standards used to determine the proper value of a
share are relatively certain, the new owner would have only the same leverage as the
prior owner. Accordingly, the corporation's interests would not be affected.
163. Such a provision is included in proposed amendments to the Model Act. See
SUBCOMMrrrEE, supra note 162, at 13.
164. See text at note 49 supra. The sale of a block of restricted securities, unless
privately placed, would involve registration costs. If not forced to sell his shares
quickly, the shareholder would probably sell his stock pursuant to rule 144 in small
quantities over a long period of time so as to avoid the high registration expense. See
note 103 supra. Accordingly it would be necessary to make some sort of equitable
apportionment of registration costs to ensure that the dissenter received the full
amount of what would have been his proceeds but for the appraisal. Normal
transaction costs, for example, should be assumed by the dissenter and not by the
corporation, since these costs would reduce net recovery even if there were no forced
sale.
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priety and amount of such a payment.1 5 In determining the amount
of the supplemental payment, the appraisers should calculate the
difference between the actual value of the shares and, as appropriate,
either the corporation's assessment of value if the shares were repurchased or the price that was obtained through sale on the market. As
discussed earlier, 66 the appraisers should presume the validity of the
market price and limit their inquiry to factors that may have distorted
that value. One possible argument against such a scheme is that all
dissenters will request a supplemental payment, thereby subjecting the
corporation to vexatious suits. However, assessing costs against the
dissenter if his claim is made in bad faith should deter such demands,
if indeed
the legal costs of dissenting do not already accomplish
1 67
this.

Such a statutory framework offers several compelling advantages.
The dissenter receives early payment for his shares and avoids the
costs of having his investment tied up for the duration of the proceedings. Moreover, the corporation, which at the time of surrender is
informed of the extent of the dissent, is given the option of repurchasing the shares or having them sold on the market. As discussed
earlier,168 the latter option allows the corporation to pay only the
difference between the market price and the appraisal value, and thus
to avoid any cash-flow problems connected with a massive repurchase
effort. Furthermore, the dissenter who receives early payment may
in fact be satisfied with his recovery and decline to seek a supplemental payment. Finally, avoidance of the vicissitudes of a market sale
altogether enhances the ability of the dissenter to receive the full value
of his shares.
165. The demand for a supplemental payment is contemplated in proposed
revisions to the Model Act, SuEcoMmIrrEE, supra note 162, at 14.
166. See text at notes 77, 78 supra.
167. See text at notes 146-54 supra.
168. See text following note 49 supra.

